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In Defense of Feres: An Unfairly Maligned Opinion
Abstract
The Supreme Court’s 1950 Feres v. United States decision held that when it enacted the Federal Tort Claims
Act Congress did not intend to waive sovereign immunity for injuries to members of the military arising out of
activity incident to their service. The Court’s decision was influenced by the long history of efforts to enact a
general tort claims bill that would free Congress from the burden of processing claims against the government,
as well as the case law, statutes, and procedures pertaining to service-members’ injuries prior to enactment of
the Federal Tort Claims Act. This Article examines those influences and the early cases that analyzed the
incident to service issue under the Act, including the Court’s Brooks decision that allowed service-member
suits for injuries that did not arise incident to service. The Article reviews the lower courts’ decisions in the
three cases that were consolidated in Feres and the parties’ briefing in the Supreme Court. The Article
addresses arguments that have been raised against Feres’ reasoning, arguments that independently attack its
holding, and various characterizations of the opinion. Because of the language of the Federal Tort Claims Act,
the historical backdrop to the Court’s decision, and the absence of any indication that Congress intended to
waive sovereign immunity for injuries suffered incident to service, Feres correctly decided that the Federal
Tort Claims Act did not encompass such injuries.
This article is available in American University Law Review: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aulr/vol60/iss2/3
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INTRODUCTION 
In its 1950 Feres v. United States1 opinion, the Supreme Court 
considered three companion Federal Tort Claims Act (―FTCA‖ or ―the 
Act‖)2 cases involving claims of military members arising from injuries 
that occurred while they were on active duty.3  The Court concluded that 
Congress had not intended to include such claims in the Act‘s general 
                                                      
 1. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 2. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (establishing an administrative procedure for tort claims 
against federal agencies and granting United States district courts jurisdiction to hear such 
claims, subject to specific exceptions and jurisdictional exclusions). 
 3. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949); Griggs v. United States, 
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949). 
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waiver of sovereign immunity.4  Accordingly, it held that, ―the Government 
is not liable under the . . . Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries 
arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service.‖5  In practice, 
this means that members of the military cannot sue the government in tort 
for injuries related to their military service. 
Judges, bar associations, attorneys, and academics have severely 
criticized the Feres decision.  The Court is accused of willfully ignoring a 
straight-forward statute6 by creating an exception to the FTCA that 
Congress deliberately rejected.7  It is charged that Feres ―and its progeny 
have wrought untold injustice.‖8  In sum, according to this school of 
thought, ―[g]iven the absence of historical or legal support, the Feres 
doctrine appears to be the product of little more than judicial lawmaking.‖9 
The burden of this Article is to show that the Supreme Court correctly 
decided the Feres case in 1950.  Part I reviews the historical and legal 
backdrop to Feres.  It discusses the considerations and decades-long 
legislative efforts that led to the enactment of the FTCA.  It then evaluates 
the four mechanisms through which service members sought financial 
relief for service-connected injuries prior to enactment of the FTCA.  The 
uniform compensation system Congress established for service members 
and veterans provided substantial benefits.  Tort litigation under pre-FTCA 
statutes that waived sovereign immunity, however, was unsuccessful 
because those statutes were held to exclude claims of service members who 
had a Congressionally-provided administrative remedy.  The Military 
                                                      
 4. The Feres opinion concludes, ―We do not think that Congress, in drafting this Act, 
created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected injuries or death 
due to negligence.  We cannot impute to Congress such a radical departure from established 
law in the absence of express congressional command.‖  340 U.S. at 146. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 875 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting) (―[T]he only conceivable reason for the Court to engage in re-writing of such a 
momentous statute was that it believed that Congress had not given enough protection to the 
government against the men and women in the armed forces.‖). 
 7. See, e.g., ABA & BAR ASS‘N OF D.C., REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 12 
(2008) (―The Court—almost 60 years ago—wrote into the FTCA an additional exception 
that Congress could have added but deliberately did not.‖).  The American Bar Association 
approved Recommendation 10(b), which urged ―Congress to examine the ‗incident to 
service‘ exception to the [FTCA] created by the Supreme Court in Feres . . . [and] provide 
that only the exceptions specifically provided in the Act limit active duty military members‘ 
access to the courts.‖  2008 ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND 
MEETING OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 11 (2008), 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2008/annual/docs/select_committee_report.doc. 
 8. Kevin J. Barry, A Face Lift (and Much More) for an Aging Beauty:  The Cox 
Commission Recommendations to Rejuvenate the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2002 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 57, 119–20 (2002). 
 9. Jonathan Turley, Pax Militaris:  The Feres Doctrine and the Retention of Sovereign 
Immunity in the Military System of Governance, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
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Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act authorized and paid 
administrative settlements to service members for various tort claims, but 
not for ―injury or death occur[ring] incident to their service.‖10  
Congressionally-enacted private laws for the benefit of individual injured 
service members did not produce compensation because few such bills 
were passed by Congress, and those that did were vetoed.   
Part II analyzes the key, pre-Feres judicial opinions that addressed 
whether service members could sue under the FTCA.  It examines two 
seminal opinions by U.S. District Judge William Chesnut, the first rejecting 
the government‘s argument that the FTCA did not apply to suits arising 
from military service and the second granting dismissal on that basis.  It 
analyzes the district court and Fourth Circuit opinions in the Brooks 
litigation, and the parties‘ briefing of that case before the Supreme Court.  
It reviews the Court‘s 1949 Brooks decision which held that service 
members could sue under the FTCA for injuries not incurred incident-to-
service.11  Finally, it summarizes the three circuit court opinions12 that 
raised the common issue the Court resolved in Feres:  whether the FTCA 
provides a remedy for injuries arising incident to military service.13  
Part III reviews the Supreme Court proceedings in Feres.   
It examines the government‘s Supreme Court briefs and those of the three 
plaintiffs.  It summarizes the Court‘s Feres decision.  To provide a 
background for considering the criticisms of the decision that ensued, it 
briefly reviews the Court‘s subsequent, related opinions.  
Part IV considers the Feres opinion and the criticisms leveled against it.  
It evaluates the Feres opinion and the reasoning supporting the Court‘s 
conclusion that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to apply to injuries 
that arose incident to military service.  It examines criticisms that directly 
challenge Feres‘ reasoning, including arguments that the FTCA does not 
require parallel private person liability, that state tort law can properly be 
used in service member suits despite the federal relationship between them 
and the government, and that the Court misjudged the importance of the 
military compensation system to the FTCA.  It also examines two 
criticisms that independently attack Feres‘ holding.  The first argues that 
earlier drafts of the FTCA included an exception for claims of service 
members that was not included in the Act; the second asserts that Feres 
                                                      
 10. Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-67, 59 Stat. 225 (1946) 
(codified with some difference in language in 1946 at 31 U.S.C. § 223b, now codified at 10 
U.S.C. §§ 2731–39 (2006)). 
 11. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50–51 (1949). 
 12. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir 1949); Griggs v. United States, 
178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1949). 
 13. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
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undermines the deterrence aspect of tort law.  Finally, Part IV considers 
labels that have been pinned onto the Feres opinion—that it judicially 
created an extra exception to the FTCA, that it usurped the role of 
Congress, and that it fostered injustice. 
The Article concludes with an appraisal of the logical consequences of 
the Feres holding.  These include the limited authority of the Feres 
decision outside its FTCA context, the importance of the rationales of the 
decision in deciding whether the FTCA or other areas of the law provide a 
financial remedy to service-members, and whether the Feres holding can 
be altered by the judiciary. 
I. THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE FERES DECISION 
A. Sovereign Immunity and Enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
The doctrine of sovereign immunity, as it is understood in American 
jurisprudence, provides that a sovereign state can be sued only to the extent 
that it has consented to be sued and that only its legislative branch can give 
such consent.14  Unless Congress has enacted an applicable waiver of the 
United States‘ sovereign immunity, the federal government cannot be sued 
for damages.15   
―A waiver of the Federal Government‘s sovereign immunity must be 
unequivocally expressed in statutory text, . . . and will not be 
implied . . . .‖16  Accordingly, no one could sue the United States in tort 
until Congress passed a statute waiving the government‘s sovereign 
immunity for such a suit.17  The Federal Tort Claims Act provided such a 
general waiver for tort cases when it became law in 1946.18 
                                                      
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (stating that the principle 
that power to consent is reserved to Congress is central to our understanding of sovereign 
immunity); accord United States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940) 
(―Consent alone gives jurisdiction to adjudge against a sovereign.  Absent that consent, the 
attempted exercise of judicial power is void. . . .  Public policy forbids the suit unless 
consent is given, as clearly as public policy makes jurisdiction exclusive by declaration of 
the legislative body.‖). 
 15. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (―Thus, except as Congress has 
consented to a cause of action against the United States, ‗there is no jurisdiction  
. . . in any . . . court to entertain suits against the United States.‘‖ (quoting United States v. 
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 587–88 (1941))); United States v. McLemore,  
45 U.S. 286, 288 (1846) (―[T]he government is not liable to be sued, except with its own 
consent, given by law.‖); see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821) (―The 
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the 
United States; that the judiciary act does not authorize such suits.‖). 
 16. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 
503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)); 
U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. at 514. 
 17.  See Lane, 518 U.S. at 192 (stating that the ability to sue the United States relies 
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American citizens have a First Amendment right to petition the 
government for redress of grievances.19  From the beginning of the 
Republic, individuals have used that right to seek special private legislation 
granting them financial remedies for damages caused by the government, 
including tort damages.20  Also from the beginning, members of Congress 
recognized that legislation was a poor way to resolve private claims against 
the government.  On February 23, 1832, John Quincy Adams wrote: 
There is a great defect in our institutions by the want of a court of 
Exchequer or Chamber of Accounts.  [Deciding claims] is judicial 
business, and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do with it.  
One-half of the time of Congress is consumed by it, and there is no 
common rule of justice for any two of the cases decided.  A deliberative 
assembly is the worst of all tribunals for the administration of justice.
21
 
By the twentieth century, the legislative process had proven particularly 
ill-suited to resolving tort claims.22  The process was subject to inordinate 
delays and arbitrary actions.23  Congressional procedures were inadequate 
to the task of promptly and effectively resolving tort claims on their merits.  
                                                      
upon statutory authority). 
 18. Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified in 
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Paul Frederic Kirgis, Section 1500 and the Jurisdictional 
Pitfalls of Federal Government Litigation, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 301, 302 (1997) (citing 
WILSON COWEN ET AL., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY, PART II:  
ORIGIN-DEVELOPMENT-JURISDICTION, 1855–1978, at 9 (1978)). 
 20. See Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
77th Cong. 49–55 (1942) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463]; James E. 
Pfander & Jonathan L. Hunt, Public Wrongs and Private Bills:  Indemnification and 
Government Accountability in the Early Republic, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 20, 23 (forthcoming 
2010), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/pfander.paper.pdf 
 21. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 49.  On December 18, 
1854, Senator Broadhead of Pennsylvania similarly stated:   
[O]ne third of the [Senate‘s] time, to say nothing of the time spent by committee—
is set apart for the consideration  of private bills . . . .  Our time is too valuable to be 
occupied in discussing the merits or demerits of a private bill.  Frequently, we 
dispute about the facts of a case presented in an ex parte way, the truth of which 
could be better ascertained by a tribunal differently constituted. 
Id.   
 22. In 1926, the House of Representatives procedure for enacting such a private bill 
called for the claim to be referred to the Committee on Claims.  H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 13 
(1926) (Supplementary Report of Congressman Emanuel Celler), cited in Hearings on H.R. 
5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 50–51.  If the committee took favorable action, the 
claim would be forwarded to the House where it would be placed on the Private Calendar.  
Id.  Any member could strike it from that calendar for any reason.  Id.  
 23. See id. (stating that the Committee on Claims could meet for a century and still not 
adjudicate all pending claims).  In 1926, Congressman Charles Underhill of Massachusetts 
said, ―The power vested in the chairman of the Committee on Claims is tremendous and 
absolutely wrong.  I can either refuse arbitrarily to consider your claim or I can take up each 
and every one of your claims to suit my convenience.‖   
67 CONG. REC. 7527 (1926), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, 
at 52. 
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In 1926 Congressman Celler explained that the ―Committee on Claims 
ha[d] no facilities nor ha[d] the members time or inclination to pass upon 
questions of negligence and contributory negligence, to sift evidence, and 
determine a host of matters.‖24  Witnesses were not cross-examined.25  
The process imposed substantial burdens on the time and attention of 
Congress.26  Narrow waivers of sovereign immunity did become law, as 
then Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea explained in 1942 when 
he presented the Administration‘s detailed recommendation for what 
became the Federal Tort Claims Act:  
[T]he ban upon suits against the Government [was] lifted in certain cases 
sounding in tort. . . .  During the [F]irst World War, when the 
Government took over operation of the railroads and other utilities, 
Congress made the United States subject to the same responsibility for 
property damage, personal injury, and death as the private owners 
themselves would have been.  A few years later, in 1920 and 1925, the 
Government consented to suits in the district courts upon admiralty and 
maritime torts involving Government vessels, without limitation as to 
amount.
27
 
These statutes did not significantly stanch the number of private bills.  In 
1926, the House Committee on Claims favorably reported a general tort 
claims bill, largely because of the burden private claims imposed on 
Congress.28  The committee noted that in the previous Congress (the 68th), 
more than two thousand private bills were introduced, but only 250 were 
enacted.29  It explained that ―[m]embership on the Committee on Claims 
ha[d] become a nearly intolerable burden, not only because of the number 
of claims submitted but because of the realization that careful judicial 
consideration of the claims [wa]s for the most part impossible.‖30 
                                                      
 24.  H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 14 (Supplementary Report of Congressman Emanuel 
Celler), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 51.  Congressman 
Ross Collins of Mississippi testified that, ―I made up my mind that Congress was wasting its 
time in playing around with these comparatively minor private bills, and that the 
consideration given to them by the individual membership was trifling.‖  A General Tort 
Bill:  Hearing Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Claims,  
72d Cong. 6 (1932), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 53. 
 25. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 54 (statement of 
Congressman Robison). 
 26. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 49–55 (collecting 
criticisms from various legislators that the private bill process is cumbersome, inefficient, 
and burdensome); S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30–31 (1946) (noting that thousands of private 
bills were introduced and hundreds were approved); H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945) 
(same).  
 27. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 24.   
 28. See H.R. REP. NO. 69-667, at 1–2 (stating that the purpose of the bill is to ease the 
burden on Congress), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 50. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
PAUL FIGLEY 60.2 
400 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:393 
 
In 1931, the House Committee on Claims issued a similar report on 
another tort claims bill, noting the continued ―burden on Congress and the 
injustice to claimants, because of the lack of facilities for proper and 
adequate investigation of these claims.‖31  The situation was no better in 
1940, when Congressman Celler explained that the committee could not 
know the details of each of the thousands of claims it considered in every 
Congress.32  In both the 74th and 75th Congresses, over 2,300 private claim 
bills were introduced, seeking more than one hundred million dollars.33  In 
the 77th Congress, there were 1,829 private claims bills, followed by 1,644 
in the 78th Congress.34 
Various legislative proposals for a broad tort claims act were debated for 
decades.35  In 1929, both houses of Congress passed such a bill, but 
President Coolidge pocket vetoed it, apparently because it would have 
authorized the Comptroller General (an agent of Congress) to represent the 
United States in the Court of Claims.36   
In the 76th Congress, the House passed H.R. 7263, a bill similar in many 
respects to the FTCA, but in 1940, ―the pressure of other urgent matters 
prevented its consideration in the Senate before the close of the session.‖37  
On January 14, 1942, President Roosevelt sent a formal message to 
Congress urging the enactment of a tort claim act so that Congress and the 
Executive Branch could deal with larger matters and noting that in the 
previous three Congresses, fewer than twenty percent of the 6,300 private 
claim bills became law, and that private claims bills accounted for a third 
of the bills he had vetoed.38  In the 77th Congress, the Senate passed S. 
2221, a bill similar to the prior Congress‘ H.R. 7263.39   
                                                      
 31. H.R. REP. NO. 71-2800, at 2 (1931), quoted in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and  
H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 52. 
 32. Debates on H.R. 7236, 86 CONG. REC. 12018 (1940), quoted in Hearings on  
H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 54. 
 33. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945). 
 34. Id. 
 35. See generally Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 40–41 
(discussing the introduction of various legislative remedies in previous decades); LESTER S. 
JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS  
§§ 2.09–2.10 (2009).   
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 71-2800, at 1 (1931), cited in Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, 
supra note 20, at 41 (statement of Assistant Att‘y Gen. Francis M. Shea).  ―The Attorney 
General objected to the act because it placed the Comptroller General in charge of appeals 
to the Court of Claims from his own decisions, and the act received a pocket veto by 
President Coolidge.‖  Id.; see also O.R. McGuire, Tort Claims Against the United States, 19 
GEO. L.J. 133, 134–35 (1931) (discussing the history of President Coolidge‘s pocket veto). 
 37. H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945). 
 38. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 1 (1942).  The Roosevelt Administration, through the 
Department of Justice, was actively involved in drafting proposals for a general tort claims 
act.  See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 6–36 (statement of 
Assistant Att‘y Gen. Francis M. Shea); Hearings on H.R. 7236 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of 
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The legislative and administration proposals for a general tort claims act 
waiving sovereign immunity for government tort claims shared a common 
limitation—almost all of them had a cap on damages.  For example, the 
1929 proposal passed by the 70th Congress had a limitation of $50,000 for 
property damages and $7,500 for personal injury or death claims.40  The 
1940 House bill had a cap of $7,500 for all claims,41 as did President 
Roosevelt‘s 1942 proposal,42 and the House bill of 1942.43  The 1942 
Senate-passed version capped damages at $10,000.44  In the 79th Congress, 
when passage of a statute was at hand, the House bill capped damages at 
$10,000 for ―property loss or damage or personal injury or death.‖45  At the 
Senate‘s insistence, the proposed damages cap was deleted from the 
statute.46   
Finally, the 79th Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act as Title 
IV of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.47  On August 2, 1946, 
President Truman signed the Legislative Reorganization Act, making the 
FTCA law.48  The President‘s signing statement commended Congress for 
                                                      
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 15–31 (1940) (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, 
Special Assistant to the Att‘y Gen.); JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 2.10 (noting 
that Roosevelt‘s Department of Justice collaborated with other governmental agencies to 
draft a federal tort bill).  
 39. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 2 (1945); see also S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 6 (1942) 
(waiving sovereign immunity in part as did H.R. 7236).   
 40. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 41. 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 4 (1940). 
 42. H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 2 (1942).   
 43. Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 2. 
 44. S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 2, 6.   
 45. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 4 (1945). 
 46. S. REP. NO. 79-1400, at 30 (1946).  The report stated: 
The essential difference is that the House bill puts a maximum limitation of 
$10,000 on claims for which suit may be brought, whereas this title as reported by 
your committee contains no such limitation.  The committee is of the opinion that 
in view of the banning of private claim bills in the Congress no such limitation 
should be imposed . . . . 
Id. 
 47. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).  The Legislative Reorganization Act also 
established the organization of congressional committees, id. tits. I, II; regulated lobbying, 
id. tit. III; eliminated the need for congressional approval of each new bridge, id. tit. V; and 
altered congressional pay, id. tit. VI. 
Pertinent to the FTCA, Title I prohibited private bills in circumstances where the FTCA 
might provide a remedy: 
No private bill . . . directing (1) the payment of money for property damages, for 
personal injuries or death for which suit may be instituted under the [FTCA] . . . 
shall be received or considered in either the Senate or the House of 
Representatives. 
Id. § 131.  The Legislative Reorganization Act also generally repealed pre-FTCA laws that 
authorized federal agencies to pay compensation for the torts of federal employees.  Id. § 
424(a). 
 48. 92 CONG. REC. 10,675 (1946) (statement by President Truman upon signing the 
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improving its efficiency, expanding the staff of Congressional committees 
and of agencies in the Legislative Branch, and raising Congressional 
salaries and expense allowances.49  It did not mention the Federal Tort 
Claims Act.50 
The FTCA grants United States district courts specific, limited subject 
matter jurisdiction.51  This jurisdictional grant was intended to limit the 
waiver of sovereign immunity:  ―The bill therefore does not . . . lift the 
immunity of the United States from tort actions except as jurisdiction is 
specifically conferred upon the district courts by this bill.‖52  Thus, claims 
that would not lie against a private person under state law are not 
cognizable under the Act.53  The FTCA contained a number of explicit 
exceptions to its waiver of sovereign immunity,54 including two that 
obviously would block some suits by injured service members.  The 
combatant activity exception bars ―[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant 
activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of 
war.‖55  The foreign tort exception bars ―[a]ny claim arising in a foreign 
country.‖56   
B. Financial Remedies of Service Members Prior to the  
Federal Tort Claims Act 
This Section addresses avenues that members of the military might have 
pursued to obtain financial relief for service-connected injuries incurred 
prior to the effective date of the FTCA.  It briefly reviews the uniform 
compensation systems available to service members and veterans.  It 
examines lawsuits brought by military personnel under limited waivers of 
sovereign immunity enacted by Congress.   
It discusses the administrative remedies available under the Military Claims 
                                                      
Legislative Reorganization Act).  President Truman‘s statement is available through The 
American Presidency Project.  Statement by the President Upon Signing the Legislative 
Reorganization Act, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12480 (last visited Oct. 24, 2010).  
 49. 92 CONG. REC. 10,675. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Federal Torts Claim Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 410(a), 60 Stat. 812 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2006)); The Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 862, (recodifying Title 28 
of United States Code).  Alterations in the language of the FTCA did not substantively alter 
the law.  Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 n.9 (1950). 
 52. H. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 5 (1945). 
 53. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477–78 (1994) (recognizing the FTCA‘s 
jurisdictional requirement of comparable private person liability under state law); infra 
notes 460–462 and accompanying text. 
 54. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006) (listing exceptions). 
 55. See id. § 2680(j). 
 56. See id. § 2680(k). 
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Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act.  Finally, it reviews private 
relief legislation designed to provide extra benefits to particular injured 
service members beyond those available under established compensation 
systems, and President Truman‘s and President Eisenhower‘s vetoes of 
those few private bills passed by Congress.   
1. The Uniform Compensation Systems 
Congress has provided pensions for military veterans since the 
Revolutionary War.57  The World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924 consolidated 
laws that established benefits for World War I veterans and their 
dependents.58  In 1933, Congress gave the President, acting through the 
Veterans Administration, the authority to administer by regulation the 
benefits programs for the veterans of World War I and their dependents.59  
From 1941 through 1946, Congress enacted a large number of statutes 
building on that system and considered many more.60   
At the time the FTCA became law, a wide range of remedies were 
available to service members, veterans, and their families.  Monthly 
pensions were provided for service members with partial or total 
disabilities.61  Pensions were provided for the widows, children, and 
                                                      
 57. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 84, 13 Stat. 499 (Civil War); Act of May 13, 
1846, ch. 16, 9 Stat. 9, 10 (Mexican War); Act of April 24, 1816, ch. 68, 3 Stat. 296–97 
(War of 1812); Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 243, 244 (Revolutionary War); Act of 
September 29, 1789, ch. 24, 1 Stat. 95 (Revolutionary War). 
 58. World War Veterans Act, 68 Pub. L. No. 242, 43 Stat. 607 (1924) (―An Act to 
consolidate, codify, revise, and reenact the laws affecting the establishment of the United 
States Veterans‘ Bureau and the administration of the War Risk Insurance Act, as amended, 
and the Vocational Rehabilitation Act, as amended.‖). 
 59. Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, 48 Stat. 8.  The act also encompassed 
veterans of the Spanish American War, the Boxer Rebellion, and the Philippines 
Insurrection.  Id. § 1. 
 60. For example, from October 17, 1942 to June 30, 1943, Congress introduced 2,366 
general bills whose main purpose was to alter veterans‘ benefits and enacted twenty-two 
into law.  1943 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 30–41.  In the period from July 1, 
1945 to August 2, 1946, it considered 1,677 such bills and enacted fifty-eight into law.  
1946 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 49–61; see also Brief for the United States at 
19, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) (Nos. 388 and 389) [hereinafter U.S. 
Brooks Br.].  The United States argued: 
The most recent compilation of ―Laws Relating to Veterans,‖ [compiled by 
Superintendent, Document Room, House of Representatives, 1948] sets forth the 
text of over 490 federal statutes enacted during 1914 to 1948.  Current 
congressional concern for providing an adequate and specialized system of 
compensation for serviceman‘s injury or death is also evidenced by the 
introduction during the fiscal year 1947, of approximately 2300 bills pertaining to 
veterans‘ benefits, and by the introduction of almost 100 such bills during the first 
10 days of the first session of the 81st Congress. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 61. 38 U.S.C. § 701a (1946); Act of July 13, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-144, 57 Stat. 554; 
Act of March 20, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-2, § 1(a), 48 Stat. 8. 
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dependent parents of service members who were injured or killed.62  
Service members who were incapacitated drew full military pay for their 
period of incapacitation.63  Service members injured while in service 
received free medical care.64  If a service member died in service, six 
months pay was paid to his or her beneficiary.65  Subsidized life insurance 
was available to service members under the National Service Life 
Insurance Act.66  Unlike typical workers‘ compensation statutes, benefits 
provided to service members and veterans compensated any injury, 
disability, or death that arose at any time during their period of service, not 
just those incurred while the service member was acting within the scope of 
employment or on active duty.67  Veterans were given hiring preferences in 
the civil service,68 housing benefits,69 and educational benefits.70 
Huge numbers of service members, veterans, and their families benefited 
from these programs in the 1940s.  On June 30, 1947, 1,728,516 World 
War II veterans were receiving disability benefits.71  On that date, death 
benefits were being paid to dependents of 223,554 World War II veterans 
for service-connected deaths, and dependents of another 2,053 for non-
service connected deaths.72  In the fiscal year of 1947, similar payments 
were made to World War I veterans‘ dependents for 76,760 service-
connected deaths and 154,717 non-service connected deaths.73 
                                                      
 62. 38 U.S.C. § 701c (1946); § 1(c), 48 Stat. at 8. 
 63. See 10 U.S.C. § 847(a) (1946) (stating that incapacitation arising from alcohol or 
drug abuse, as opposed to injury, will not warrant payment); Act of June 16, 1942, Pub. L. 
No. 77-607, 56 Stat. 359, 364 (providing allowances for medically ill service members); Act 
of May 17, 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-230, 44 Stat. 557 (stating that service members who are 
absent from their duties because of venereal disease are permitted allowances). 
 64. 38 U.S.C. § 434 (1946); § 6, 48 Stat. 8, 9; World War Veterans‘ Act, Pub. L. No. 
68-242, § 10, 43 Stat. 607, 610 (1924). 
 65. Act of December 17, 1919, Pub. L. No. 66-99, 41 Stat. 367, amended by Act of 
December 17, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-198, 57 Stat. 599. 
 66. National Service Life Insurance Act, ch. 757, 54 Stat. 1008, 1009, 1012 (1940). 
 67. Act of September 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-439, 58 Stat. 752.  The statute deemed 
any injury or disease to ―have been incurred in line of duty‖ if the service member was ―on 
active duty or on authorized leave‖ when the injury or disease arose.  Id. § 2.  The only 
exceptions were injuries or disease that resulted from the service member‘s ―own willful 
misconduct,‖ or arose while the service member was deserting, absent without leave, or 
―confined under sentence of court martial or civil court.‖  Id. 
 68. Act of June 27, 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-359, 58 Stat. 387, 388. 
 69. Servicemen‘s Readjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 78-346, § 501, 58 Stat. 284, 292 
(1944) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 694(a) (1946)).  
 70. Id. § 400, 58 Stat. 284, 287–91 (1994), (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 739, Part VIII 
(1946)). 
 71. 1947 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 19. 
 72. Id. at 24, 25. 
 73. Id. at 26, 27. 
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2. Tort litigation by military personnel under pre-FTCA  
waivers of sovereign immunity 
Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, Congress passed other statutes that 
waived the government‘s sovereign immunity for specific categories of 
torts.74  These included the Suits in Admiralty Act75 and the Public Vessels 
Act,76 which consented to suits involving admiralty and maritime torts of 
government vessels, and the Railroad Control Act of 1918,77 which 
consented to tort suits against the government for its operation of railroads 
and utilities under wartime authority.  Despite language in these statutes 
that made the United States liable to the same extent as a private entity, the 
statutes were consistently interpreted to exclude claims made by members 
of the military for whom Congress had provided an administrative 
remedy.78 
Dobson v. United States,79 the leading authority on the issue, arose from 
the collision of the Steamship City of Rome and United States Submarine 
S-51, a public vessel.80  Suits were brought under the Public Vessels Act by 
the estates of three submarine officers who died as a result of the 
collision.81  Following judgment for the United States in the district court, 
the Second Circuit confronted the issue whether the Public Vessels Act 
                                                      
 74. See supra text accompanying note 27 (statement of Assistant Att‘y Gen. Francis M. 
Shea) (explaining pre-FTCA waivers of sovereign immunity for suits in tort). 
 75. Act of March 9, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-156, § 2, 41 Stat. 525 (codified at  
46 U.S.C. § 30903 (2006)).  The statute provided:   
That in cases where if such vessel were privately owned or operated, or if such 
cargo were privately owned and possessed, a proceeding in admiralty could be 
maintained at the time of the commencement of the action herein provided for, a 
libel in personam may be brought against the United States . . . provided that such 
vessel is employed as a merchant vessel or is a tug boat . . . .   
Id. at 525–26. 
 76. Act of March 3, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-546, 43 Stat. 1112 (current version at  
46 U.S.C. § 31102 (2006)).  The statute provided, ―[t]hat a libel in personam in admiralty 
may be brought against the United States, or a petition impleading the United States, for 
damages caused by a public vessel of the United States.‖  Id. at 1112. 
 77. Act of March 21, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-107, § 10, 40 Stat. 451, 456.  The statute 
provided:  
That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities 
as common carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or at common law 
. . . . Actions at law or suits in equity may be brought by and against such carriers 
and judgments rendered as now provided by law; and in any action at law or suit in 
equity against the carrier, no defense shall be made thereto upon the ground that the 
carrier is an instrumentality or agency of the Federal Government.  
Id. 
 78. See infra notes 79–105 and accompanying text (discussing how courts have 
interpreted the statutes to exclude claims of service members).  
 79. 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 80. Haselden v. United States, 24 F.2d 529, 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1927), aff’d sub nom. 
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 81. Id. 
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provided a remedy for the officers‘ deaths under these circumstances.82  
The court accepted that the language of the Public Vessels Act, read alone, 
might be broad enough to allow suit by officers and crew of a public 
vessel.83  Nevertheless, it ruled that no recovery could be had on behalf of 
the submarine officers from the United States, reasoning that the statute did 
not specify who might sue and that allowing such suits would be ―so 
radical a departure from the government‘s long-standing policy with 
respect to the personnel of its naval forces that we cannot believe the act 
should be given such a meaning.‖84  The court recognized that the elaborate 
pension system provided to naval personnel was less generous than the 
recovery available under the Public Vessels Act.  The court found, 
however, that the statute‘s general language was insufficiently specific to 
justify upsetting long-standing and well-known policy.  The court 
explained that ―[t]he more natural meaning of the act is to refer it to 
damage caused by the ship to third persons who are not of her company, 
and generally, if not universally, the damage will be the result of a 
collision.‖85 
The Second Circuit again addressed the issue of service member suits 
against the federal government in Bradey v. United States,86  
a Public Vessels Act suit alleging that a Navy fireman was killed in 1944 
when his destroyer was negligently struck by another vessel owned by the 
United States.87  The circuit court affirmed the district court‘s dismissal.88  
Judge Learned Hand, writing for the court, explained: 
It is quite true that nothing in the text of the Public Vessels Act bars suit 
by a member of the armed forces, but in Dobson . . . we held that, 
because of the compensation elsewhere provided for such persons, they 
must be deemed excluded from its protection. That case directly rules 
here . . . .
89
 
A similar line of authority holds that the government‘s waiver of 
sovereign immunity in the Railroad Control Act did not open the United 
                                                      
 82. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 808. 
 83. Id.   
 84. Id. at 808–09; see also O‘Neal v. United States, 11 F.2d 869, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1925) 
(―Congress by this enactment [of the Public Vessels Act] clearly did not intend to overturn 
the government‘s established policy, and permit its employees to bring actions for damages 
received on government ships in the course of their employment . . . .‖), aff’d per curiam, 11 
F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1926). 
 85. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809.  The court also addressed statutes that provided 
administrative compensation for lost property of officers and sailors.  Id.  
 86. 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 87. Id. at 742. 
 88. Id. at 743. 
 89. Id.  
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States to suit by service members.90  In Moon v. Hines,91 a Reserve 
Officers‘ Training Corps soldier was injured while traveling by rail under 
military orders on September 30, 1918, and brought a tort action against the 
Director General of Railroads.92  The Supreme Court of Alabama 
concluded that the soldier‘s administrative compensation provided under 
the War Risk Insurance Act93 was exclusive, barring his suit in tort.94  The 
court reasoned that Congress had not authorized such a suit against the 
government arising from its transportation of a service member.95  It 
explained that the soldier‘s enlistment was a contract that changed his 
relationship with the government, giving him a new status with different 
rights and duties.96 
In Seidel v. Director General of Railroads,97 a World War I sailor 
walking down the street to his ship lost an eye when a railroad guard‘s 
shotgun accidentally fired.98  The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the 
sailor‘s war risk insurance barred his suit in tort:  ―If plaintiff had this 
remedy by suit in damages he would have against the government two 
remedies:  One in damages; and one under said act.  The government has 
not so provided; but has provided only the one remedy under said act.‖99 
In Sandoval v. Davis,100 the district court dismissed three consolidated 
actions of enlisted men who were allegedly injured or killed while in the 
line of duty by negligent operations of railroads under federal control.101  
Each family had accepted compensation under the war risk insurance 
program.102  The court concluded that a suit in tort was barred ―because of 
the compensation provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act.‖103  The 
Sandoval opinion spoke to its similarity to the Moon and Seidel decisions:  
The conclusion in these three cases is the same.  The three different 
courts reached this conclusion by somewhat different argument.  It 
seems to me that the reasoning of all three opinions is sound.  Congress 
                                                      
 90. See Moon v. Hines, 87 So. 603, 607 (Ala. 1921).  
 91. 87 So. 603 (Ala. 1921). 
 92. Id. at 603–04. 
 93. The 1917 amendments to the War Risk Insurance Act provided benefits for the 
death or disability of all enlisted personnel and officers in the United States military.  See 
Act of October 6, 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-91, § 300, 40 Stat. 398, 405.    
 94. Moon, 87 So. at 607. 
 95. Id. at 607–08. 
 96. Id. at 608. 
 97. 89 So. 308 (La. 1921). 
 98. Id. at 308.  
 99. Id. at 309. 
 100. 278 F. 968 (N.D. Ohio 1922), aff’d per curiam, 288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923). 
 101. Id. at 969–70, 974–75. 
 102. Id. at 970. 
 103. Id. at 972.   
PAUL FIGLEY 60.2 
408 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:393 
 
did not intend to confer upon an injured or killed soldier or sailor a right 
to a double recovery of compensation from the United States. . . .  The 
general creation and preservation of rights of action by section 10, 
Federal Control Act, and section 206, Transportation Act of 1920, must 
yield to the specific provisions covering the injuries of a soldier or sailor 
on active service in the line of his duty.  The rights and remedies of a 
soldier or sailor in that situation are specially provided for and limited by 
the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act.
104
 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, per curiam.105   
3. The Military Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act 
In 1943, Congress enacted the Military Claims Act to consolidate a 
number of statutes that previously authorized the War Department to settle 
tort claims administratively.106  The procedures, scope, and limitations of 
those statutes varied greatly.107  The Military Claims Act was intended to 
―make possible the investigation, settlement, and payment in a uniform 
manner of all small claims; i.e. those not in excess of $500, or in time of 
war not in excess of $1,000, within the War Department.‖108  The act did 
not authorize lawsuits, but established an administrative remedy 
for damage to or loss or destruction of property, real or personal, or for 
personal injury or death, caused by military personnel or civilian 
employees of the War Department or of the Army while acting within 
the scope of their employment, or otherwise incident to noncombat 
activities of the War Department or of the Army . . . .
109
 
                                                      
 104. Id. at 974–75. 
 105. Sandoval, 288 F. at 56–57 (citing Dahn v. Davis, 258 U.S. 421 (1922)) (holding that 
the Federal Employees‘ Compensation Act was an exclusive remedy, barring suit under the 
Railroad Control Act). 
 106. Act of July 3, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-112, 57 Stat. 372 (codified with some difference 
in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§§ 2731-39 (2006)). The consolidated statutes included:  Act of August 24, 1912, Pub. L. 
No. 62-338, 37 Stat. 569, 586, that authorized settlements of claims of up to $1,000 
―occasioned by heavy gun fire and target practice of troops, and for damages to vessels, 
wharves, and other private property, found to be due to maneuvers or other military 
operations for which the Government is responsible,‖ id.; Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 335, 23 
Stat. 350, as amended by Act of July 9, 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-193,  
40 Stat. 845, 880, and by Act of March 4, 1921, Pub. L. No. 66-391, 41 Stat. 1436, allowing 
settlement of claims by military personnel for loss of personal property, id.; Act of 
December 28, 1922, Pub. L. No. 67-375, 42 Stat. 1066, that authorized ―the head of each 
department . . . to . . . adjust . . . any claim . . . on account of damages to or loss of privately 
owned property where the amount of the claim does not exceed $1,000, caused by the 
negligence of any officer or employee of the Government acting within the scope of his 
employment.‖  Id. § 2.  See generally Martha L. Neese & Thomas J. Lyons, The Military 
Claims Act:  Remedy or Run Around?, 14 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 305, 307–09 (1990). 
 107. S. REP. NO. 78-243, at 3 (1943). 
 108. Id. at 2. 
 109. Act of July 3, 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-112, 57 Stat. 372, 372–73. 
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The Secretary of War or his designee could settle such claims outright 
or, if they exceeded $1,000, report them to Congress ―for its 
consideration.‖110  The statute did not require the claimant to make a 
showing of negligence or wrongful act.111  The Military Claims Act remedy 
was not available if the damage or injury was ―caused in whole or in part 
by any negligence or wrongful act on the part of the claimant, his agent, or 
employee,‖ or if a written claim was not presented within one year.112  Nor 
did it apply ―to claims for damage to or loss or destruction of property . . . 
or for personal injury or death of [military personnel or civilian employees 
of the War Department or of the Army] if such . . .  injury, or death 
occur[red] incident to their service.‖113 
The Military Claims Act was deemed inadequate because it compensated 
some claims of military personnel but arbitrarily excluded similar claims 
that did not fall within the precise language of the statutes that had been 
consolidated in the Act.114  The Secretary of War recommended clarifying 
legislation specifically directed to the claims of service members and 
civilian employees of the War Department.115  Accordingly, Congress 
enacted the Military Personnel Claims Act of 1945.116   
A key change made by the newer act allowed military members and 
civilian employees to recover on claims for loss or damage to property 
even if that loss or damage was incurred incident-to-service.117  The 
incident-to-service bar however, was retained for claims alleging personal 
injury or death.118  The Military Claims Act and the Military Personnel 
Claims Act were codified together in the 1946 edition of the United States 
Code.119   
                                                      
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. (emphasis added). 
 114. See H.R. REP. NO. 79–237, at 1–2 (1945) (―[T]he present statutes . . . do not grant 
equal justice in that the claim of one member of the Army may be approved while a similar 
claim by another member who lost property in the same incident  
is . . . barred by some technical limitation of the law.‖). 
 115. Id. at 2–4 (attaching Letter from Robert Patterson, Acting Sec‘y of War (Feb. 2, 
1945)). 
 116. Act of May 29, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-67, 59 Stat. 225 (codified with some 
difference in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C.  
§§ 2731–39 (2006)). 
 117. See 59 Stat. at 225–26. 
 118. Id. (―The provisions of this Act shall not be applicable to claims . . . for personal 
injury or death of military personnel or civilian employees of the War Department or of the 
Army if such injury or death occurs incident to their service.‖ (emphasis added)).   
 119. 31 U.S.C. § 223b.  In 1945 the Secretary of the Navy received comparable 
authority.  Act of December 28, 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-277, 59 Stat. 662 (codified with some 
difference in language at 31 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1946), now codified at 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-39 
(2006)).  The compensation provided for injury or death not ―incident to service‖ was 
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4. Private relief bills for injured service members & the Uniform 
Compensation System 
Like other citizens, members of the military can seek private legislation 
to compensate them for injuries caused by the government.120  In the years 
before the FTCA was enacted, private bills were not viable avenues to 
increased compensation for injured military service members, perhaps 
because of the general awareness that systems were in place to provide 
appropriate relief121 and out of concern for uniformity.122  In fact, from 
1942 through 1947, no private bills granting monetary benefits to World 
War II veterans or their dependents became law.123   
The 79th Congress did act favorably on a private bill that would have 
awarded $500 in money damages to Ensign Joseph Lanser for injuries he 
incurred in a Navy bus accident on August 26, 1944, while serving in the 
military.124  However, on August 2, 1946, the same day he signed the 
FTCA into law, President Truman vetoed the Lanser private bill to preserve 
the established uniform system for the compensation of those injured while 
in military service.125  The President was typically succinct in explaining 
why he decided to veto the serviceman‘s remedy: 
Ensign Lanser was on active duty with the Navy at the time of the 
accident.  He was hospitalized in a naval hospital and is entitled to the 
same rights and benefits extended to all other members of the armed 
forces who sustained personal injuries while in an active duty status.  No 
reason is evident why special treatment should be accorded this 
officer.
126
 
In 1948, President Truman again cited the importance of treating injured 
service members uniformly when he vetoed a $4,244 private bill for the 
relief of the estate of Lee Jones Cardy, a Navy chief pharmacist mate who 
was killed in a vehicle accident caused by government negligence near San 
                                                      
limited to reasonable medical and burial expenses.  31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946). 
 120. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950); Jefferson v. United States, 77 
F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Md. 1948) aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).  
 122. See infra text accompanying notes 124–33 (comments of Presidents Truman and 
Eisenhower). 
 123. 1947 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 146; 1946 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. 
ANN. REP. 108; 1945 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 69; 1944 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ 
AFFS. ANN. REP. 68; 1943 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 66; 1942 ADM‘R OF 
VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. REP. 67.  Indeed, as of 1947 only two private bills granting financial 
relief to World War I veterans had become law.  See 1947 ADM‘R OF VETERANS‘ AFFS. ANN. 
REP. 146. 
 124. H.R. DOC. NO. 79–767, at 1–2 (1946)(returning H.R. 4660, a bill for the relief of 
Mrs. Georgia Lanser and Ensign Joseph Lanser, without his approval). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1. 
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Diego on November 17, 1944.127  The President explained that ―[a]pproval 
of this measure . . . would be discriminatory in character in that it would 
grant to the estate a special benefit denied to the estates of other members 
of the armed forces where the facts are similar.‖128  He noted in detail the 
benefits Chief Cardy‘s family would receive under laws administered by 
the Veterans‘ Administration and the military services,129 and found that 
payment of those benefits distinguished this private bill from those of 
civilians who had no administrative remedy.130  
President Eisenhower voiced similar concerns when he vetoed private 
relief legislation intended to override final Veterans‘ Administration 
decisions denying benefits.131  In vetoing a bill that would have deemed a 
World War II veteran‘s eye injury to be service-connected, the President 
stated: 
I consider it unwise to set aside the principles and rules of administration 
prescribed in the general laws governing veterans‘ benefit programs.  
Uniformity and equality of treatment to all who are similarly situated 
must be the steadfast rule if the Federal programs for veterans and their 
dependents are to be operated successfully. 
132
 
                                                      
 127. Harry S Truman, S. DOC. NO. 80–179, at 1–3 (1948) (returning, without his 
approval, bill S. 252 for the relief of the estate of Lee Jones Cardy). 
 128. Id. at 2–3.   
 129. Id. at 2.  These included:  Navy-paid death gratuity payment equal to six months 
pay ($756); Army-paid burial expenses ($227.93); Veterans‘ Administration monthly 
payments for death compensation to Mr. Cardy‘s widow ($78/month); Veterans‘ 
Administration monthly payments for death compensation to Mr. Cardy‘s mother 
($54/month); and Government life insurance monthly installments ($36.20) from Mr. 
Cardy‘s $10,000 policy.  Id.  The 1947 median income for a male U.S. Worker was $2,324.  
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 1988 to 2003 Annual Social and Economic 
Supplements, 
 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/histinc/p53ar.html. 
 130. S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 3.  President Truman likewise vetoed a private bill that 
would have paid a lump sum of $10,000 to pilot Ernest Jenkins who was injured in a 1942 
Georgia airplane crash while on active duty with the Civil Air Patrol.  Harry S Truman, S. 
DOC. NO. 81-120, at 1–3 (1949)(returning bill S. 377, an Act for the Relief of Ernest J. 
Jenkins, without his approval).  The President stated: 
[I]t is clear that to single [Jenkins] out for special treatment in this fashion would 
discriminate against and deny equal justice to others who may have suffered 
equally or worse.  
  The records of the Civil Air Patrol indicate that over 50 of its members lost 
their lives and somewhat less than 100 were injured on its missions in World War 
II.  Benefits are still being paid under the civilian war-benefits program to the 
dependents of 33 members who were killed and to  
4 members who were injured. 
Id. at 2. 
 131. H.R. DOC. NO. 83–426, at 1–3 (1954) (returning bill H.R. 3109, 83d Cong. (1954) 
an Act for the relief of Theodore W. Carlson, without his approval). 
 132. Id. at 2. 
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He used identical language when he vetoed a bill that decreed a soldier who 
committed suicide in 1943 while in a Mississippi guardhouse ―shall be held 
and considered to have [died] in line of duty.‖133   
II. JUDICIAL ANTECEDENTS TO FERES AFTER ENACTMENT OF THE 
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT 
This part examines the key, pre-Feres judicial decisions that addressed 
whether, and to what extent, the FTCA provided a remedy to members of 
the military.  It begins by examining the two seminal district court opinions 
in Jefferson v. United States134 that influenced much of the subsequent 
jurisprudence.135  It discusses the Brooks v. United States136 litigation that 
culminated in the Supreme Court‘s decision, reached a year before Feres, 
which held that the FTCA authorized suits by service members for injuries 
that did not arise incident to military service.137  It ends by describing the 
Jefferson, Griggs, and Feres circuit court decisions that were jointly heard 
by the Supreme Court in Feres.138 
A. Judge Chesnut & Jefferson v. United States 
In the Jefferson litigation, United States District Judge William Chesnut 
of the District of Maryland issued a pair of influential opinions that laid the 
groundwork for the Feres debate.139  The Jefferson cases arose from an 
army surgeon‘s negligence in leaving a thirty-inch by eighteen-inch towel 
in the body cavity of his patient, Army flight chief Arthur Jefferson, an 
active duty soldier.
140
  The United States moved to dismiss, arguing that 
Congress had not intended for the FTCA to authorize suits by service 
members for the negligence of other service members.141  It reasoned that 
the veterans‘ benefits programs provided an exclusive remedy, citing 
Public Vessel Act cases which held that military members could not sue the 
government in tort although that statute waived sovereign immunity for 
                                                      
 133. H.R. DOC. NO. 83-432, at 1–2 (1954) (returning bill H.R. 6242, 83d Cong. (1954) 
an Act for the relief of Mrs. Josette L. St. Marie, without his approval). 
 134. 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Jefferson v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 209 (D. 
Md. 1947). 
 135. Supra note 135. 
 136. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 137. Id. at 54. 
 138. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), 
rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 
535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 139. See Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 708; Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 210. 
 140. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 708. 
 141. Id. at 711. 
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injuries caused by a United States public vessel.142  The government also 
argued that the relationship between it and its service members was of a 
special nature unlike typical master-servant or employer-employee 
relations.  Therefore, it concluded, Congress did not intend the FTCA to 
apply to claims arising from the mutual duties and obligations running 
between military members and the government which are governed by 
federal law143 when the FTCA applies the tort law applicable to private 
persons under the state law ―of the place where the act or omission 
occurred.‖144   
In a carefully written opinion of October 23, 1947, Judge Chesnut denied 
the United States‘ motion to dismiss without prejudice.145  While 
acknowledging the ―plausibility and force‖146 of the argument that 
Congress did not intend for the FTCA to authorize all suits by members of 
the military because it had created ―an elaborate system of disability and 
pension allowances‖147 for them, he noted that the Act specifically included 
members of the military in its definitions of ―‗Employee of the 
Government‘ [and] ‗[a]cting within the scope of . . . employment,‘‖148 
thereby bringing their torts within the Act‘s general waiver of sovereign 
                                                      
 142. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 210–11 (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d 
Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)).   
 143. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 211 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 
(1947)).  In Standard Oil, the government sought to recover the amount of pay and medical 
expenses it had expended for a soldier injured by a negligently driven Standard Oil truck.  
332 U.S. at 302.  The Court declined to decide the case under state law, reasoning that: 
Perhaps no relation between the Government and a citizen is more distinctively 
federal in character than that between it and members of its armed forces.  To 
whatever extent state law may apply to govern the relations between soldiers or 
others in the armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental 
agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the relation 
between persons in service and the Government are fundamentally derived from 
federal sources and governed by federal authority. 
Id. at 305–06.  It explained that state law is inappropriate for deciding such issues.  Id. at 
309–10 (―Not only is the government-soldier relation distinctively and exclusively a 
creation of federal law, but we know of no good reason why the Government‘s right to be 
indemnified in these circumstances . . . should vary in accordance with the different rulings 
of the several states . . . .‖).  The Court held that the United States could not recover because 
it is for Congress to decide whether the United States can bring suit to recover losses it 
sustains for injury to its soldiers, and Congress had not created such a cause of action.  Id. at 
315–17. 
 144. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. at 211 (quoting Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No.  
79-601 § 402(b), 60 Stat. 842 (1946) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006))). The 
government also argued that under general Military Law, a government is not liable to a 
soldier of the militia injured by the negligence of fellow soldiers.  Id. at 214.  
 145. Id. at 209–10, 216. 
 146. Id. at 211. 
 147. Id. at 210. 
 148. Id. at 211 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act § 402(b)–(c) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 
2671 (2006))). 
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immunity.149  He also noted that the Act included twelve enumerated 
exceptions to the general waiver, but not one explicitly for claims by 
service members although prior legislative proposals had included an 
exception for ―claims for which compensation was provided by the . . . 
World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924.‖150  He expressed concern that the 
Public Vessels Act cases were distinguishable because that act had very 
general language about who could bring suit151 compared to the FTCA‘s 
explicit jurisdictional grant152 and its clear intent to allow suits against the 
government for ―the negligent acts of military personnel.‖153  Recognizing 
that the military stands in a special, federal relationship to the 
government,154 he acknowledged that there may be merit to the argument 
that allowing the Jefferson suit might create a ―heretofore non-existent 
tort, . . . not within the intention of Congress‖ under circumstances where a 
private person would not be liable under state law as required by the 
FTCA‘s jurisdictional grant.155  Nonetheless, he was not persuaded, 
concluding that the motion to dismiss should be denied without prejudice, 
but suggesting that, ―[p]erhaps the proper application of the Act will 
become clearer on further argument and consideration and the possible 
narrowing of issues by the developed facts of the particular case.‖156 
On May 7, 1948, following a trial on the merits, Judge Chesnut revisited 
the government‘s motion to dismiss and issued a second opinion.157  The 
judge made findings of fact that during a cholecystostomy operation on 
July 3, 1945, while Mr. Jefferson was on active duty,158 his military 
surgeon negligently left in his body cavity a towel thirty inches long and 
eighteen inches wide, marked ―Medical Department U.S. Army.‖159  The 
towel was removed when it was discovered during an operation on March 
13, 1946.160  Mr. Jefferson suffered a serious hernia which made it doubtful 
that he could return to his occupation as a mechanic.161  After his discharge, 
                                                      
 149. Id. at 211. 
 150. Id. at 211–12 (citing 86 CONG. REC. 12015–32 (1940)). 
 151. Id. at 212–13. 
 152. Id. at 213 (citing Federal Tort Claims Act § 410(a) (codified at 28 U.S.C.  
§ 1346(b) (2006))). 
 153. Id. at 214. 
 154. Id. at 215 (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1947)).  
 155. Id. at 215. 
 156. Id. at 216. 
 157. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 706, 711 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 
1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 158. Id. at 708.  Mr. Jefferson had enlisted in the Army on October 22, 1942, when he 
was forty-five years old, and received his honorable discharge on January 9, 1946.  Id. 
 159. Id. at 708–09. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 709. 
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Mr. Jefferson applied for service-connected disability payments and, at the 
time of trial, was receiving 100% disability from the Veterans‘ 
Administration of $138 per month, for a prospective lifetime award of 
$31,947.162  The court found that had he been able to return to his prior 
employment, ―[t]he commuted value of this earning capacity for [his] 
estimated life expectancy of 22 years would be about $45,000.‖163  Judge 
Chesnut concluded that if Jefferson had a valid claim under the FTCA and 
his administrative awards were deducted from his damages, ―a sum of 
$7,500 would be an appropriate verdict.‖164 
After setting forth his findings of fact, Judge Chesnut revisited the 
question raised in the government‘s motion to dismiss.165  He cogently 
stated the issue: 
The problem of statutory construction now presented is whether the 
comprehensive phrase ―any claim against the United States, for money 
only‖ . . . without words of limitation as to classes of persons who may 
make the claim, should be narrowed by construction to exclude claims 
made by members of the Armed Forces of the United States for service-
connected injuries sustained while in such service, in view of the special 
relationship long existing between the United States and members of its 
military forces, and the large body of federal legislation upon the subject.  
These include elaborate provisions for pay and allowances and 
retirement benefits . . . .
166
 
He recognized that the problem was especially difficult because the 
FTCA contained a number of explicit exceptions but none that barred all 
service-connected claims by service members, although a prior draft of the 
Act had included an exception ―for the same general purpose.‖167  
Nonetheless, he concluded that the FTCA did not encompass such 
claims.168 
In explaining this decision, Judge Chestnut noted the principle of 
statutory construction that a statute should not be read literally when, ―from 
the whole subject matter of the particular Act and its setting in the whole 
governmental scheme, the court can see that the literal import of the phrase 
used is contrary to established policy and would not accord with the real 
intention of Congress in passing the Act.‖169  He recognized the ―close 
                                                      
 162. Id. at 710. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 710–11. 
 165. Id. at 711. 
 166. Id.  
 167. Id. at 712. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 712 (citing United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174 (1935); Ozawa v. United 
States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563 (1918)). 
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precedent‖ of the Second Circuit Public Vessels Act170 cases that barred 
claims of service members despite statutory language that generally 
allowed suit ―‗against the United States . . . for damages caused by a public 
vessel of the United States.‘‖171  He cited Burkhardt v. United States172 for 
the proposition that the literal language of one phrase of the FTCA is ―not 
applicable in view of other provisions of the Act.‖173   
The judge explained that ―the main purpose‖ of the FTCA was to waive 
sovereign immunity for ―the ordinary run of tort claims arising in the 
United States,‖174 but that the FTCA was only one part (Title IV) of the 
more comprehensive Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.175  Title I of 
that Act prohibited private relief bills for claims that might be brought 
under the FTCA.176  He noted that Congress enacted this provision because 
it was overburdened by the deluge of such private bills and ―that an 
important if not the main motivation of Congress in enacting the Tort Act 
was to transfer such claims to the courts.‖177  He further noted that private 
bills to benefit service members for service-connected injuries were 
uncommon because of the many administrative remedies Congress had 
provided to them.178  Accordingly, he found it ―probable‖ that damages 
claims of soldiers for service-connected injuries ―were not within the 
contemplation of Congress‖ when it enacted the FTCA.179 
Judge Chesnut concluded that claims of military members arising from 
their military duty did not fall within the FTCA‘s jurisdictional language 
that defined the government‘s tort liability by the standard of a private 
person under the law of the state where the tort took place, because ―such 
injuries did not constitute common law or statutory torts under the laws of 
the several States,‖ and no ―State legislation could properly have affected 
the relations of the United States to members of its armed forces which, of 
                                                      
 170. Id. (citing Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 781–90 (1946) (now codified at 46 
U.S.C. §§ 31101–13 (2006))).   
 171. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United 
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); O‘Neal v. United States, 11 F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1926)).  
 172. 165 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1947). 
 173. Id. at 712 (citing Burkhardt, 165 F.2d 869).  Burkhardt held that despite language of 
the FTCA limiting liability to ―circumstances where the United States, if a private person, 
would be liable [to the claimant] in accordance with the law of the place,‖ state statutes of 
limitations defenses are inapplicable because the FTCA included statutes of limitations. 165 
F.2d at 871, 874 (citing FTCA § 410(a)). 
 174. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 712; see also id. at 713 (citing S. REP. NO. 79-1400 
(1946)); H.R. REP. NO. 79-2614 (1946). 
 175. Id. at 712. 
 176. Id. (citing Legislative Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, § 131, 60 Stat. 812, 
831 (1946)).  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 712–13. 
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course, depended purely on federal law.‖180  He found support for this 
conclusion in United States v. Standard Oil Co.,181 which held that the 
government had no right to subrogation for injuries to its military members 
because Congress had not created one ―in federal law, and . . . it would be 
incongruous to give such a right of action in view of the variable State laws 
which might apply to any particular soldier dependent upon where he 
happened to be at the time.‖182  He quoted Standard Oil‘s summary of the 
―distinctively federal‖ nature of the United States‘ relationship to its 
military members.183  He concluded that the FTCA‘s private person under 
state law standard for assigning tort liability is ―inapt‖ for the military 
plaintiff.184 
B. Brooks v. United States 
The Feres decision was foreshadowed by the Brooks v. United States185 
case, which the Supreme Court decided on May 16, 1949.186  In Brooks, 
two brothers on furlough from the Army187 were driving with their father in 
a private car on a public highway when a civilian federal employee driving 
an Army truck negligently struck them.188  Following a trial on the merits, 
District Judge Cavanah entered a judgment of $4,000 for the personal 
injuries of Welker Brooks,189 and one of $25,000 for the wrongful death of 
Arthur Brooks.190  On January 7, 1948, Judge Cavanah denied the 
government‘s motion to dismiss; rejecting its argument that suit was barred 
because the Brooks brothers had received veterans‘ benefits.191  He gave 
two reasons:  First, unlike the North Carolina workers‘ compensation 
statute, no federal statute declared veterans‘ benefits to be an exclusive 
                                                      
 180. Id. at 713. 
 181. 332 U.S. 301 (1947). 
 182. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. at 713 (―[W]e know of no good reason why the 
Government‘s right to be indemnified in these circumstances, or the lack of such a right, 
should vary in accordance with the different rulings of the several states, simply because the 
soldier marches or today perhaps as often flies across state lines.‖ (quoting  Standard Oil 
Co., 332 U.S. at 310)). 
 183. Id. (quoting Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 305). 
 184. Id. at 714 (―It is hardly conceivable to analogize the liability of the United States to 
that of a private individual in respect to service-connected disabilities in view of the 
government-soldier particular relationship.‖). 
 185. 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 186. Id. at 49. 
 187. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949).  The Fourth Circuit issued its opinion on August 26, 1948.  Id. at 840.  
 188. 337 U.S. at 50. 
 189. Id.; United States v. Brooks, 176 F.2d 482, 483 (4th Cir. 1949). 
 190. Brooks, 176 F.2d at 484.  The father, James Brooks, received a judgment of $5,000 
for his personal injuries.  Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51 n.1; Transcript of Record at 27, Brooks, 
337 U.S. 49 (Nos. 388 and 389).  
 191. Transcript of Record at 19, supra note 191. 
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remedy.192  Second, because the FTCA made the government liable in the 
same manner as a private person and the then-recent Ninth Circuit 
Standard Oil decision allowed a service member to recover both 
administratively from the veterans‘ benefit program and in tort from a 
tortfeasor without subrogation by the government, ―it would follow that the 
government may make veterans‘ payments to the plaintiff and at the same 
time be liable to him as a tortfeasor.‖193   
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed in a split decision.194  Writing for 
the majority, Judge Dobie adopted much of Judge Chesnut‘s analysis in 
Jefferson, but went beyond it to conclude that all claims of military 
members were excluded from the FTCA, not just those that arose from 
their military service.195  The court noted the comprehensive nature of the 
compensation system for service members and veterans,196 the unique 
relationship between service members and the federal government,197 and 
the incongruity of barring suit by service members injured in combat or 
foreign lands but allowing claims arising from non-combat domestic 
activities: 
Thus, under the [combatant activity] exception, a soldier killed or injured 
in the important and perilous combat activities of war would be denied a 
recovery; while there would be a perfect claim for the soldier killed or 
injured in non-combat activities. Under the [foreign tort] exception, for a 
soldier injured or killed while stationed in Canada, no recovery; for a 
soldier injured or killed at Plattsburg, New York, just a few miles from 
the Canadian border, again a recovery. It is difficult for us to think that 
Congress intended such results to flow from the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.
198
   
Judge Dobie relied on the Dobson and Bradey Public Vessels Act 
decisions199 and the Sandoval Railroad Control Act opinion, all of which 
                                                      
 192. Id. at 26. 
 193. Id. (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 153 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946), aff’d, 
332 U.S. 301 (1947)). 
 194. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 195. Id. at 842–45 (citing Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711–14 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 
F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)) (―We 
are quite unable to find in the Act anything which would justify us in holding that Congress 
intended to include death of, or injury to, a soldier, which was not service-caused (the 
instant case) and to exclude service-caused injury or death (the Jefferson case).‖)). 
 196. Id. at 842–43. 
 197. Id. at 842. 
 198. Id. at 844. 
 199. Id. at 843–44 (quoting Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742, 743 (2d. Cir. 1945); 
Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807, 808, 809 (2d. Cir. 1928)) (―If it had been the purpose 
to change that policy as respects officers and seamen of the navy injured . . . by the fault of 
one another, because that is what in the end it comes to, we cannot think it would have been 
left to such general language . . . .‖). 
PAUL FIGLEY 60.2 
2010] IN DEFENSE OF FERES 419 
 
held that general waivers of sovereign immunity do not allow suits by 
service members when Congress has provided them with an administrative 
remedy.200 
In dissent, Chief Judge Parker argued it was unreasonable to think that 
Congress would overlook the potential tort ―claims of soldiers . . . at a time 
when soldiers and their rights were so prominently in the public mind.‖201  
He reasoned that the FTCA included twelve exceptions, but not one for 
claims of military members,202 although a prior version of the Act had 
included an exception barring ―[a]ny claim for which compensation is 
provided by the Federal Employees‘ Compensation Act, as amended, or by 
the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924, as amended.‖203  He rejected the 
argument that allowing suits for claims ―not arising out of service‖ would 
disrupt military discipline.204  He pointedly noted that the Brooks‘ claims 
did not involve injuries arising from their military service as had those in 
Jefferson, and ―[e]ntirely different considerations might operate to deny 
recovery in such case, as [was] suggested in the opinion of Judge 
Chesnut.‖205 
Facing this body of law, counsel for the Brooks crafted petitions for 
certiorari to avoid the key adverse authority by emphasizing that the 
brothers‘ activities at the time of the accident were entirely divorced from 
their military service.  They framed the ―Questions Involved‖ as: 
 Did Congress intend that members of the armed services should have 
no rights of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act? 
 More particularly, if a member of the armed services is injured under 
circumstances wholly unconnected with military affairs and not in any 
way growing out of any armed service status or relationship, and if the 
situation is one which may readily occur and does occur with respect to 
persons not in the armed service and is a situation in which other 
persons, in general, do clearly have rights of action under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act—did Congress nevertheless intend that in such situation 
the claimant, merely because of the circumstance that he belongs to the 
armed service, shall have no right of action?
206
 
                                                      
 200. Id. at 844 (citing Sandoval v. Davis, 288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923)). 
 201. Id. at 847 (Parker, C.J., dissenting). 
 202. Id. at 848. 
 203. Id. at 849 (noting that the missing exception ―was omitted, with apparent 
deliberation‖ (citing Federal Tort Claims Act, H.R. 181, 79th Cong. (1945)); S. REP. NO. 79-
1400, at 30 (1946)). 
 204. Id. at 850. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 3, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49 (1949) 
(Nos. 388 and 389). 
PAUL FIGLEY 60.2 
420 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:393 
 
They argued that, ―Welker B. Brooks and Arthur L. Brooks were 
soldiers.  But their being soldiers had nothing whatever to do with their 
respective injury and death‖ or the brothers‘ presence ―on the highway.‖207  
They distinguished Dobson, Bradey, and Sandoval because, unlike the 
Brooks‘ situation, ―the injuries involved in [those] . . . cases were ‗service-
caused,‘ that is, occurred because the injured men were members of the 
armed forces and incurred their injuries during the course of activities 
necessitated by or incident to their military service.‖208  They distinguished 
Jefferson on the same grounds, arguing Jefferson ―was on the operating 
table . . . only because of his being a soldier. The army surgeon was 
operating on him only because of the military and army relationship 
between the two of them.‖209  The Supreme Court granted the Brooks‘ 
petitions for certiorari on January 3, 1949.210  
The United States began its argument with the cases that excluded claims 
of service members from general waivers of the government‘s tort 
sovereign immunity.211  In response to the plaintiffs‘ argument that the 
brothers‘ injuries were not connected to their military service, the 
government maintained that the cases barring tort suits of service members 
turned on the existence of the comprehensive compensation system rather 
than the manner in which the injury was incurred.212  The government went 
on to argue that Congress had provided an ―adequate and comprehensive 
statutory system for handling death or injury claims of members of the 
armed forces,‖213 and that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to provide 
duplicate compensation.214  It explained that while a primary purpose of the 
Legislative Reform Act of 1946 and the FTCA was to increase legislative 
efficiency by removing Congress‘ responsibility for deciding private bills 
involving torts by assigning that job to the courts,215 the number of private 
                                                      
 207. Brief in Support of Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 16, Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (Nos. 
388 and 389).   
 208. Id. at 21. 
 209. Id. at 22. 
 210. Brooks v. United States, 335 U.S. 901 (1949).  The Brooks‘ petitions were filed on 
October 30, 1948, in both the personal injury case and the wrongful death case.  Petition for 
Writs of Certiorari, Brooks, 337 U.S. 49 (Nos. 388 and 389).  Accordingly, two orders were 
entered when the petitions were granted.  Brooks,  
335 U.S. 901.    
 211. U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60 at 6, 10–18.  Thus, the government cited Dobson, id. 
at 12–13; Bradey, id. at 13–14; cases construing the Railroad Control Act of 1918, id. at 14–
16; and the New York Tort Claims Act, id. at 16. 
 212. See id. at 49 (―The rationale of those cases was not, as contended by petitioner, the 
fact that the injuries were service-caused, but rather that there was in existence a 
comprehensive statutory system for making payment on such claims.‖). 
 213. See id. at 6–7; see also id. at 17–30.   
 214. See id. at 8–10, 30–49. 
 215. See id. at 30–33. 
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bills seeking money for injured or killed service members was 
insignificant.216  It reasoned that because the FTCA was enacted to allow 
the courts to decide claims that would previously have been submitted to 
Congress as private bills by those who had no administrative remedy, ―it is 
reasonable to assume that Congress did not intend the Act [to] encompass 
an entirely new and distinct group of claims arising out of the death or 
injury to soldiers for which it had already adequately provided.‖217  The 
government also argued that the plaintiffs‘ acceptance of statutory benefits 
barred any recovery under the FTCA.218   
The Supreme Court framed the question before it as ―whether members 
of the United States armed forces can recover under [the FTCA] for 
injuries not incident to their service.‖219  To answer that question, the Court 
examined as best it could what Congress had intended when it enacted the 
FTCA.220  The Court concluded that the FTCA did waive sovereign 
immunity for such claims.221  Justices Frankfurter and Douglass dissented 
―substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Dobie.‖222 
In reaching its decision, the Court recognized that neither the veterans‘ 
laws nor the FTCA explicitly stated that the remedies they provided were 
exclusive of other remedies, and that Congress had not required an election 
of remedies.223  It noted the FTCA‘s exceptions for combatant activities 
and foreign torts, and the absence of an exception for claims that might be 
compensated under the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924 that had been 
included in prior legislative drafts.224  Together, these suggested to the 
Court that Congress did have service members in mind when it enacted the 
FTCA.225   
On the other hand, the Court acknowledged the potential legitimacy of 
the government‘s argument that Congress did not intend to waive immunity 
for claims by service members for  
―[a] battle commander‘s poor judgment, an army surgeon‘s slip of hand, 
                                                      
 216. See id. at 33–35. 
 217. Id. at 36. 
 218. See id. at 50–52. 
 219. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 50 (1949). 
 220. See id. at 51 (arguing that the overseas and combatant activities exceptions made it 
plain that Congress had service members in mind when the statute was passed in 1946); id. 
at 52 (stating that consequences may provide insight for determining congressional 
purpose); id. at 53 (seeing no indication that Congress meant the United States to pay twice 
for the same injury).   
 221. See id. at 54. 
 222. Id. (Frankfurter & Douglas, JJ., dissenting) (citing United States v. Brooks, 169 
F.2d 840 (2d. Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
 223. See id. at 53. 
 224. See id. at 51–52. 
 225. See id. at 52. 
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[or] a defective jeep which causes injury.‖226  While recognizing the 
substantial authority that might support the government‘s argument in suits 
involving military situations,227 the Court concluded that the Brooks facts 
did not raise the issue because the brothers‘ injuries were not related to 
their military service: 
But we are dealing with an accident which had nothing to do with the 
Brooks‘ army careers, injuries not caused by their service except in the 
sense that all human events depend upon what has already transpired. 
Were the accident incident to the Brooks‘ service, a wholly different case 
would be presented. We express no opinion as to it, but we may note that 
only in its context do [Dobson, Bradey, and Jefferson] have any 
relevance.  See the similar distinction in 31 U.S.C. § 223b [the Military 
Claims Act and the Military Personnel Claims Act]. . . .  The 
Government‘s fears may have [a] point in reflecting congressional 
purpose to leave injuries incident-to-service where they were, despite 
literal language and other considerations to the contrary.  The result may 
be so outlandish that even the factors we have mentioned would not 
permit recovery.  But that is not the case before us.
228
 
Accordingly, the Court left for another day the question whether the FTCA 
allows suit by service members for claims arising incident to military 
service.229  Three cases squarely raising that question were in the judicial 
pipeline. 
C. The Feres, Griggs, & Jefferson Circuit Court Decisions 
In 1949, three circuit courts rendered decisions squarely dealing with the 
issue of whether the FTCA waived sovereign immunity for claims arising 
from injuries incurred incident to military service.230  These cases were 
decided together in the Court‘s Feres opinion.231 
                                                      
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United 
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); Jefferson v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 
1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 
135 (1950)). 
 228. Id. at 52–53 (citation omitted). 
 229. Id. at 53.  The Court remanded the case for determination whether the judgment 
should be reduced for previously paid administrative remedies, and whether that issue had 
been preserved for appeal.  Id. at 54.  
 230. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Griggs v. United States, 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949), 
rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950); Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 
535 (2d Cir. 1949), aff’d, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 231. Feres, 340 U.S. at 136–37. 
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1. Feres v. United States 
The Feres litigation alleged that a barracks fire and the death of U.S. 
Army Lieutenant Rudolph Feres were caused by government negligence in 
maintaining a defective heating plant and failing to guard against fire.232  
Lieutenant Feres was quartered under orders in the barracks in Pine Camp, 
New York, a federal military post.233  The district court dismissed the case, 
relying on the Fourth Circuit‘s Brooks decision.234  On November 4, 1949, 
in an opinion by Judge Augustus Hand, the Second Circuit unanimously 
affirmed.235 
The Second Circuit concluded that its Dobson and Bradey precedents, as 
followed by Judge Chesnut in Jefferson, correctly stated the established 
rule that service members cannot sue the government in tort for incident-to-
service injuries.236  Accordingly, ―[i]f more than the pension system had 
been contemplated to recompense soldiers engaged in military service we 
think that Congress would not have left such relief to be implied from the 
general terms of the Tort Claims Act, but would have specifically provided 
for it.‖237  The court saw the Supreme Court‘s Brooks decision to have 
recognized an ―exception to this interpretation [for] . . . situations where 
military personnel were not on active duty.‖238   
The court directly addressed the FTCA‘s twelve exceptions, noting that, 
―they relate to the cause of injury rather than to the character of a claimant 
who may seek to recover damages for his injuries.‖239  The court 
recognized that even though the exceptions ―relieve the government in 
certain situations from liability to all persons including civilians, they do 
not mention soldiers specifically‖ and ―[t]here would seem to have been no 
reason for mentioning soldiers when the latter had not been treated as 
having claims for injuries incident to their service.‖240  The court gave short 
shrift to the argument that Congress intended to allow FTCA suits for 
incident-to-service injuries because it had omitted from the FTCA a 
proposed thirteenth exception for, ―‗[a]ny claim for which compensation is 
                                                      
 232. 177 F.2d at 536. 
 233. Id. 
 234. See id. (citing United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d,  
337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
 235. Id. at 535. 
 236. Id. at 537 (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. 
United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928); Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 
178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States,  
340 U.S. 135 (1950)). 
 237. Id. at 537. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C.A. § 223b (1946)). 
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provided by [Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA)],  
as amended, or by the World War Veterans Act of 1924, as amended.‘‖241  
Judge Augustus Hand reasoned that FECA, as amended, provided that an 
employee receiving benefits under that act, ―‗shall not receive from the 
United States any salary, pay, or remuneration whatsoever except in return 
for services actually performed, and except pensions for [military] 
service.‘‖242  Likewise, ―the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924, as 
amended, provided that ‗no other pension laws or laws providing for 
gratuities or payments in the event of death in the service‘ . . . shall be 
applicable to disabilities or deaths made compensable under the Act.‖243  
Accordingly, the proposed thirteenth exception was likely judged 
―unnecessary.‖244  Consequently, the court affirmed dismissal of the suit.245 
2. Griggs v. United States 
Griggs v. United States246 alleged that Lt. Colonel Dudley Griggs 
underwent surgery at an Army hospital at Scott Air Base, Illinois, and died 
as a result of medical malpractice by members of the Army Medical 
Corps.247  Lt. Colonel Griggs was on active duty and was admitted to the 
hospital under orders.248  The district court granted the government‘s 
motion to dismiss on grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim for 
relief under the FTCA.249  On November 16, 1949, a divided Tenth Circuit 
panel reversed that holding.250 
Judge Murrah, writing for the majority, acknowledged that in Jefferson, 
Judge Chesnut had concluded that the broad benefits Congress provided to 
veterans indicate that ―the obvious purpose of Congress was to exclude‖ 
from FTCA coverage those claims that arise from the ―unique 
Government-soldier relationship.‖251  However, he then noted that the 
Supreme Court in Brooks ―was not moved by such considerations.‖252  The 
opinion reasoned that a claim for injury to a service member was valid 
under the FTCA ―unless it [fell] within one of the twelve exceptions 
                                                      
 241. Id. (citing H.R. 181, 79th Cong. (1945)).  
 242. Id. (quoting 5 U.S.C.A. § 757 (1946)). 
 243. Id. at 537–38 (quoting 38 U.S.C.A. § 422 (1946)). 
 244. Id. at 538. 
 245. Id. 
 246. 178 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1949) rev’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 
(1950). 
 247. Id. at 2. 
 248. Id.  
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 3. 
 251. Id. at 2. 
 252. Id. 
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specifically provided therein; or, unless from the context of the Act it [was] 
manifestly plain that despite the literal import of the legislative words, 
Congress intended to exclude from coverage civil actions on claims arising 
out of a Government-soldier relationship.‖253  Judge Murrah found nothing 
in the legislative history ―justifying judicial limitation upon the claims of 
servicemen.‖254  He observed that although Congress had included express 
exceptions for military claims in eighteen proposed tort claims bills, ―it 
conspicuously omitted‖ from the FTCA an exception for ―claims growing 
out of a government-soldier relationship.‖255  He concluded that Congress 
had deliberately decided not to exclude such claims from the Act.256  The 
opinion did not mention or address Bradey and Dobson.257  In dissent, 
Judge Huxman ―adopt[ed] the reasoning of [Judge Chesnut in] the 
Jefferson case.‖258 
3. Jefferson v. United States 
On December 19, 1949, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit 
affirmed Judge Chesnut‘s decision that because Arthur Jefferson‘s injuries 
arose from his military service, the FTCA did not provide a tort remedy for 
the medical malpractice that left a towel in his body cavity.259  The panel 
consisted of Judge Soper who authored the panel‘s opinion,260 Judge Dobie 
who had written the Fourth Circuit majority opinion in Brooks,261 and Chief 
Judge Parker who had dissented in Brooks.262  
The opinion noted that while the Jefferson litigation was proceeding 
before Judge Chesnut, the Supreme Court had decided in Brooks that 
service members could sue under the FTCA ―for injuries not incident to 
their service, but left open the question whether the statute also cover[ed] 
claims by service men for injuries incident to their service.‖263  It remarked 
that the Second and Tenth Circuits had come to opposite conclusions on 
that question in Feres and Griggs.264  The court characterized the choice as 
―between a literal interpretation of the Act and a construction which 
                                                      
 253. Id. at 2, 3. 
 254. Id. at 3. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id.   
 257. See id. at 1–3. 
 258. See id. at 3 (Huxman, J., dissenting). 
 259. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 519–20 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
 260. Id. at 518. 
 261. Id.; United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 841 (4th Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 
(1949). 
 262. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 518; Brooks, 169 F.2d at 846. 
 263. Jefferson, 178 F.2d at 519. 
 264. Id. 
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recognize[d] the peculiar relationship that exist[ed] between a member of 
the armed services and superior military authority.‖265  It recognized that 
Congress enacted the FTCA to provide a remedy for ―persons injured 
through the negligence of [government] employees‖ in the courts rather 
than through the inefficient private bill process ―which burdened the 
legislative branch . . . and caused delay.‖266  But the court saw limits on the 
scope of that remedy: 
It seems unreasonable, however, to conclude that Congress, while 
accomplishing these desirable purposes, intended at the same time to 
subject every injury sustained by a member of the armed forces in the 
execution of military orders to the examination of a court of justice . . . .  
If this were so, the civil courts would be required to pass upon the 
propriety of military decisions and actions and essential military 
discipline would be impaired by subjecting the command to the public 
criticism and rebuke of any member of the armed forces who chose to 
bring a suit against the United States.
267
 
In concluding that the FTCA did not provide a remedy for  
in-service injuries, the court attached no importance to the fact that 
proposed exceptions for claims of military personnel were dropped before 
final passage of the Act.268  It supported its conclusion by noting the 
―distinctively federal character of the government-soldier relationship,‖269 
and the unreasonableness of supposing ―in the absence of an express 
declaration on the point, that Congress intended to adopt so radical a 
departure from its historic policy as to subject internal relationships within 
the military establishment to the law of negligence as laid down by the 
courts of the several states.‖270   
It recognized that Mr. Jefferson and other service members had a wide 
range of allowances and retirement benefits, providing them with generous 
remedies outside the tort arena.271  Finally, it cited the Second Circuit‘s 
Dobson and Bradey decisions, which held in analogous circumstances that 
the Public Vessels Act waiver of sovereign immunity allowing persons to 
sue ―the United States in personam for damages caused by the negligent 
                                                      
 265. Id. at 519–20. 
 266. Id. at 520. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. (citing Orders of Ry. Conductors v. Swan, 329 U.S. 520, 529 (1946); Jewell 
Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167 United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161, 168 (1945) (stating 
that a court should not give too much weight to the language contained in discarded 
measures or to the statements of legislatures in the course of debate when interpreting a 
statute)).  
 269. Id. (citing United States v. Standard Oil Co. 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)). 
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. (citing Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 711 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 
(4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950)).  
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handling of a public vessel refers to damages suffered by third persons but 
not by members of the ship‘s company.‖272  It affirmed Judge Chesnut‘s 
dismissal of the action.273 
III. THE SUPREME COURT & THE FERES DOCTRINE 
This Part reviews the parties‘ arguments to the Supreme Court, 
summarizes the Court‘s Feres opinion, and briefly reviews the Court‘s 
other opinions related to the Feres doctrine. 
A. The Parties’ Arguments 
1. The United States’ Arguments 
The United States presented its principal arguments to the Supreme 
Court in its Griggs petitioner‘s brief.274  The government began by arguing 
that Brooks had impliedly recognized that injuries suffered incident-to-
service fell outside the Brooks holding that service members could sue 
under the FTCA.275  It reasoned that drawing a distinction between injuries 
incurred on furlough and those incurred while receiving medical care under 
orders was mandated by the need to avoid subjecting claims arising from 
military orders to varying state law rules or judicial review which would 
undermine military discipline.276  It noted that this distinction explained 
why Judge Parker concluded that the Brooks brothers could sue under the 
FTCA, but Arthur Jefferson could not.277  The government cited as direct 
precedent involving ―the identical problem presented . . . here,‖278 the 
Dobson and Bradey Public Vessel Act decisions and the Railroad Control 
Act cases that barred suit for incident-to-service injuries under those 
waivers of sovereign immunity.279  It noted that in Brooks, the Court had 
recognized that Dobson and Bradey ―would have relevance if the accident 
had occurred incident to the soldier‘s military service.‖280 
                                                      
 272. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United 
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)). 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Brief for the United States, United States v. Griggs, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 
31) [hereinafter U.S. Griggs Br.]; Brief for the United States at 3, Feres v. United States, 
340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 9) [hereinafter U.S. Feres Br.]; Brief for the United States at 4, 
Jefferson v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 29) [hereinafter 
 U.S. Jefferson Br.].  
 275. See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 275, at 9–13. 
 276. See id. at 13. 
 277. See id. at 12–13. 
 278. Id. at 18. 
 279. See id. at 14–19. 
 280. See id. at 14 (citing United States v. Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949)). 
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The United States then argued that Congress had not intended for the 
FTCA to apply to incident-to-service claims of military members.281  
Starting from the Court‘s Brooks admonition that the consequences of an 
interpretation allowing such suits ―may provide insight for determination of 
congressional purpose,‖282 it reasoned that the unique, completely federal 
relationship between government and soldier recognized by the Court in 
Standard Oil Co.283 was incompatible with the FTCA‘s requirement that 
tort liability of the government be assessed under state law.284  It noted the 
impropriety of subjecting that relationship to ―dissimilar and frequently 
irreconcilable state statutes and decisions.‖285  It argued that because the 
FTCA waived sovereign immunity only under circumstances where a 
private person would be liable under state law, and because state law did 
not allow one service member to sue another for negligence, the United 
States could not be liable on a respondeat superior basis for that 
negligence.286  It reasoned that if military members could bring suit for 
service-connected injuries, ―it is obvious that the military decisions, orders, 
and conduct which constituted the basis for the [claim] . . . would be 
thrown open to judicial examination,‖287 undermining military discipline.288  
It argued that the Legislative Reorganization Act‘s repeal289 of portions of 
the Military Claims Act290 did not authorize suit for incident-to-service 
injuries because only provisions allowing recovery were repealed and the 
―Military Claims Act . . . does not include claims by servicemen for injury 
or death sustained by them incident to their military service.‖291  The 
government concluded by noting that the military and veterans‘ benefits 
laws provided ready compensation for injured service members and their 
families.292 
                                                      
 281. See id. at 19–28. 
 282. Id. at 20 (quoting Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52). 
 283. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305–06 (1947) (holding that the 
United States could not seek indemnity under state law for payments it made on behalf of an 
injured soldier because the relationship between the Government and service members was 
governed entirely by federal law). 
 284. U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 21–26.   
 285. Id. at 21. 
 286. See id. at 33–37. 
 287. Id. at 27; see id. at 26–28 (citing United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 845 (4th 
Cir. 1948), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
 288. See id. at 35–36; see also id. at 24–28. 
 289. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 repealed those statutes that allowed 
agencies to make compensatory payments to persons injured by government negligence.  
Pub. L. No. 79–601, § 424a, 60 Stat. 812, 846 (1946). 
 290. See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 29.  When the brief mentions the Military 
Claims Act, it cites 31 U.S.C. § 223b and apparently refers to both the Military Claims Act 
and the Military Personnel Claims Act.  Id. at 29–30. 
 291. See id. at 30. 
 292. See id. at 37–39 (noting that Mrs. Griggs could expect to receive over $22,000 in 
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2. The Plaintiffs’ Arguments 
The Griggs, Jefferson, and Feres plaintiffs all argued that the Brooks 
holding authorized their suits because there was no basis for distinguishing 
soldiers on furlough from those asleep in barracks or receiving care in 
hospitals.293  The plaintiffs argued that the FTCA‘s language was plain on 
its face and allowed their suits.294  They argued that under canons of 
construction, the FTCA should be interpreted to allow incident-to-service 
claims, pointing to the FTCA‘s exceptions for discretionary functions,295 
combatant activities,296 and foreign torts,297 and the deletion from the 
FTCA of a comparable exception for service members‘ claims that had 
been in prior drafts:  ―[T]he deliberate rejection of this proposed exception 
demonstrate[s] that Congress did not intend to exclude members of the 
armed forces suffering injuries or death in the United States, and not in 
combat, regardless of any other rights . . . conferred under the World War 
Veterans‘ Act of 1924 as amended.‖298  Their overarching argument was 
that ―[n]either the act as written, its legislative history or avowed purpose 
permitted the [c]ourt below to read into the act an exception that was not 
there.‖299 
Responding to the government‘s arguments, the plaintiffs urged that 
Dobson, Bradey, and similar cases arose under statutes that were narrower 
                                                      
compensation from her various federal benefits, but that the Illinois wrongful death statute 
limited damages to $15,000); see also U.S. Jefferson Br., supra note 274, at 3–4 (noting that 
Jefferson could expect to receive approximately $35,500 in benefits, roughly $7,500 less 
than the judgment value of his case).  The United States also incorporated by reference, 
arguments raised in its Brooks brief.  See U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 30 n.9. 
 293. Brief for Respondent at 6–7, 10–11, United States v. Griggs, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) 
(No. 31) [hereinafter Resp‘t Griggs Br.]; Brief For Petitioner at 14–17, Feres v. United 
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 9) [hereinafter Pet‘r Feres Br.]; Brief for Petitioner at 4–7, 
Jefferson v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 29) [hereinafter Pet‘r Jefferson Br.] 
(―Whether injured on furlough or in an army hospital, each is on active duty and subject to 
military control though not engaged in the performance of their normal duties, each is 
entitled to the same special statutory benefits . . . .‖) (emphasis in original).  
 294. See Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 5–7; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 7–
8; Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 10; see also id., at 7 (stating that the Act was just as 
clear as it was in the Brooks case).  
 295. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 13.  
 296. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 6; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 16; Pet‘r 
Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 15.  
 297. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 6; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 16.  
 298. Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 8–11 (citing United States v. Brooks,  
337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)) (noting that sixteen of the eighteen bills introduced between 1925 
and 1935 for tort claims acts had proposed the exclusion of claims for service members); 
Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 7–8. 
 299. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 5.  Feres also argued that because the FTCA was 
complementary to the provision of the Legislative Reorganization Act banning private bills 
on tort claims, ―it seem[ed] evident . . . that Congress wanted to rid itself of the great 
number of private bills for relief of military personnel and their families presented at every 
session.‖  Id. at 12. 
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in scope and purpose than the FTCA,300 and that when Congress deleted the 
proposed World War Veterans Act exception, it ―repudiated and made 
inapplicable to the [FTCA] the doctrine of the Dodson [sic] . . . [and] 
Bradey case[s].‖301  They raised the same point in response to the defense‘s 
argument that applying state law to tort claims by service members was 
incompatible with the federal nature of that relationship and not something 
Congress had contemplated.302  They further argued that Congress had 
appropriately chosen to ―make the laws of the different states the test of 
liability‖ for service members, as it had for other federal matters such as 
tax law and bankruptcy law,303 and that the FTCA‘s exceptions and various 
state law defenses adequately protected the government‘s interests.304  
Griggs argued that Congress‘ failure to include exclusionary ―service 
caused claims‖ language in the FTCA as it had in the Military Claims Act, 
―indicate[d] that Congress did not choose to exclude such claims from [the 
FTCA].‖305  Jefferson and Feres argued that the Military Claims Act and 
the Military Personnel Claims Act had no bearing here because they 
provided compensation without regard to fault and the FTCA required a 
negligent or wrongful act.306   
The plaintiffs argued that the military and veterans compensation statutes 
did not say they were exclusive,307 their benefits were ―not . . . all-inclusive 
[or] complete,‖308 and the Court‘s Brooks decision had held that those 
benefits did not cut off service members‘ rights under the FTCA.309  The 
plaintiffs disputed that allowing FTCA suits would disrupt military 
discipline, reasoning that ―military personnel likely would be better 
disciplined . . . [with] knowledge that the Government had accorded them 
                                                      
 300. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 18 (―The decisions in the Dobson and Bradey 
cases are founded upon acts whose legislative history and purpose are not parallel to the 
[FTCA].‖); Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 10–11 (arguing that the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 and the FTCA had a ―double purpose‖ of removing ―the 
anachronistic doctrine of sovereign immunity to actions in tort . . . and . . . reliev[ing] 
Congress of the burden of . . . private bills‖ that demonstrate a different policy than the 
maritime statutes addressed by Dobson and Bradey). 
 301. Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 14. 
 302. See id. at 16. 
 303. See id. at 16–17. 
 304. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16–17. 
 305. See Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 19. 
 306. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 4–5, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (No. 
9) [hereinafter Pet‘r Feres Reply Br.]; Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 12.  
 307. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 11 (―Unlike Workmen‘s Compensation 
statutes, there is nothing in the veterans‘ or servicemen‘s benefit statutes providing for 
exclusiveness of remedy.‖). 
 308. Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 19. 
 309. Id. at 20–21; Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 11; Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra 
note 293, at 10–11. 
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the right to recover for injuries negligently inflicted upon them,‖310 that 
giving new rights and benefits to America‘s World War II military 
personnel resulted in ―the best disciplined [forces] this country has ever 
produced,‖311 and that military discipline was adequately protected by the 
Articles of War and courts martial.312  Jefferson contested that civilian 
judges would have to evaluate military decisions, reasoning that ―no 
military decision was involved in the performance of surgery.‖313 
Responding to the argument that no American law allowed one member 
of the armed forces to sue another, Griggs generally conceded the point, 
but attributed it to a soldier‘s immunity akin to intra-family immunity.314  
Griggs then reasoned that the government was liable on a respondeat 
superior basis under the Restatement of Agency for such torts because, 
―although a servant acting in the course of his employment might not be 
liable to his wife or child by reason of his immunity, the master may 
nevertheless be held liable.‖315  Jefferson argued that military personnel 
were generally liable for torts at common law, noting a 1616 English case 
where one active duty soldier sued another.316  Feres argued that ―American 
Common Law did not refuse to recognize the right of a soldier to maintain 
an action against another soldier for acts arising while on duty,‖317 but he 
cited only encyclopedia passages that did not address suits by service 
members for negligence.318 
                                                      
 310. Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16; accord Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, 
at 19.  Feres‘ attorneys took a different tack, arguing that military discipline considerations 
are not relevant to a soldier‘s widow who should be able to sue just as a convict‘s family 
could sue even though the convict is barred.  Pet‘r Feres Br., supra note 293, at 18–19 
(citations omitted). 
 311. Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 16. 
 312. Id. 
 313. Id. (citation omitted). 
 314. Resp‘t Griggs Br., supra note 293, at 21. 
 315. Id. at 21–22 (―A master or other principal is not liable for acts of a[n] . . . agent 
which the agent is privileged to do although the principal himself would not be so 
privileged, but he may be liable for an act as to which the agent has a personal immunity 
from suit.‖ (quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 217(2) (1933)).  The brief then 
quotes a comment to section 217:  ―Thus if a servant while acting within the scope of 
employment negligently injures his wife, the master is subject to liability.‖  Id. at 22 
(quoting RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 217 cmt. b (1933).  
 316. See Pet‘r Jefferson Br., supra note 293, at 12–13 (citing Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 
Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.); Hobart 134). 
 317. Pet‘r Feres Reply Br., supra note 306, at 5. 
 318. Id. (citing and quoting 36 AM. JUR. Military § 119 (1941) (―An officer will, 
however, be liable to the soldiers under him for acting in an illegal and unauthorized manner 
toward them.‖); 6 C.J.S. Army & Navy § 36 (1937) (―An officer is not answerable for an 
injury done within the scope of his authority, unless influenced by malice, corruption, or 
cruelty . . . .‖)). 
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B. The Feres Decision 
The common fact in Feres, Griggs, and Jefferson was that ―each 
claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to 
negligence of others in the armed forces.‖319  Justice Jackson, writing for 
the Court, squarely understood the issue to be one of ―statutory 
construction‖—―whether the Tort Claims Act extend[ed] its remedy to one 
sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what under other circumstances would 
be an actionable wrong.‖320  No legislative history addressed this issue.321  
This made the task of statutory interpretation difficult, a point the Court 
readily acknowledged.322   
The Court recognized arguments that favored liability, including:  the 
FTCA granted district courts jurisdiction over negligence claims against the 
United States;323 the FTCA contemplated liability for the torts of service 
members acting within the line of duty;324 the FTCA did not include an 
exception barring suits by service members, although prior bills had;325 
and, finally, Brooks allowed FTCA suits by service members and ―it is 
argued that much of its reasoning is as apt to impose liability in favor of a 
man on duty as in favor of one on leave.‖326  
The Court determined that the FTCA ―should be construed to fit, so far 
as will comport with its words, into the entire statutory system of remedies 
against the Government to make a workable, consistent and equitable 
whole.‖327  It examined the history that led to passage of the FTCA, noting 
the expansion of the federal government and the corresponding increase in 
the number of ―remediless wrongs‖ caused by government negligence, the 
growing number of private bills seeking compensation, the inadequacy and 
capriciousness of the Congressional claims process, and Congress‘ prior 
legislation allowing certain types of claims.328  It stated: 
                                                      
 319. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
 320. Id. 
 321. See id. 
 322. See id. (stating that because no committee reports or floor debates disclosed what 
effect the statute was designed to have on the problem or even that Congress had the 
problem in mind, no conclusion was above challenge).   
 323. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V 1946)). 
 324. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2671 (Supp. V 1946)). 
 325. See id. at 138–39 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)) (stating 
that all but two of the eighteen tort claims bills introduced in Congress between 1925 and 
1935 expressly denied recovery to members of the armed forces but that the present Tort 
Claims Act made no exception). 
 326. Id. at 139.  The Court rejected this argument because ―[t]he actual holding in the 
Brooks case [could] support liability here only by ignoring the vital distinction there stated.  
The injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in the course of military duty.‖  Id. at 146.  
 327. Id. at 139. 
 328. Id. at 139–40. 
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At last, in connection with the Reorganization Act, [Congress] waived 
immunity and transferred the burden of examining tort claims to the 
courts.  The primary purpose of the Act was to extend a remedy to those 
who had been without; if it incidentally benefited those already well 
provided for, it appears to have been unintentional.  Congress was 
suffering from no plague of private bills on the behalf of military and 
naval personnel, because a comprehensive system of relief had been 
authorized for them and their dependents by statute.
329
 
The Court acknowledged that the FTCA granted jurisdiction to decide 
tort cases, but noted, ―it remain[ed] for courts, in exercise of their 
jurisdiction, to determine whether any claim [was] recognizable in law.‖330  
It found that the FTCA‘s text provided ―the test of allowable claims, which 
is, ‗The United States shall be liable . . . in the same manner and to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances . . . ,‘ with 
certain exceptions not material here.‖331  It concluded that the plaintiffs‘ 
claims did not meet this test because the ―plaintiffs [could] point to no 
liability of a ‗private individual‘ even remotely analogous to that which 
they [were] asserting against the United States.‖332  No American precedent 
had allowed service members to sue the government or their officers for 
negligence, and no private person had power comparable to the federal 
government‘s over its service members.333  The Court recognized that ―if 
we consider relevant only a part of the circumstances and ignore the status 
of both the wronged and the wrongdoer in these cases we find analogous 
private liability,‖ but liability under the FTCA ―is that created by ‗all the 
circumstances,‘ not that which a few of the circumstances might create.‖334  
It concluded that no parallel private liability existed and ―no new one has 
been created by . . . this Act.‖335 
The opinion considered the ―law of the place‖ requirement of § 1346(b), 
through which the FTCA adopts the substantive tort law of the state where 
the tortious act took place.336  It noted that service members had no say 
over where they were posted, that workers‘ compensation laws in ―most 
states ha[d] abolished the common-law action for damages between 
employer and employee and superseded it with workman‘s compensation 
statutes which provide[d], in most instances, the sole basis of liability,‖ and 
                                                      
 329. Id. at 140. 
 330. Id. at 140–41 (―Looking to the detail of the Act . . .‖); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 
U.S. 471, 477 (1994); infra note 462.  
 331. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (Supp. V 1946)).  
 332. Id. 
 333. See id. at 141–42. 
 334. Id. at 142. 
 335. Id. 
 336. See id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (Supp. V 1946)). 
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that state tort law varied widely as to liability, defenses, and damages.337  
The Court concluded, ―[i]t would hardly be a rational plan of providing for 
those disabled in service by others in service to leave them dependent upon 
geographic considerations over which they have no control and to laws 
which fluctuate in existence and value.‖338   
The Court spoke to the ―distinctively federal‖339 relationship between the 
government and its service members, citing its three-year-old Standard Oil 
Co.340 decision that barred the government from recovering the damages it 
incurred providing care to an injured soldier: 
 The considerations which [led] to [the Standard Oil Co.] decision 
apply with even greater force to this case:  ―. . . To whatever extent state 
law may apply to govern the relations between soldiers or others in the 
armed forces and persons outside them or nonfederal governmental 
agencies, the scope, nature, legal incidents and consequences of the 
relation between persons in service and the Government are 
fundamentally derived from federal sources and governed by federal 
authority.‖
341
 
It observed that no federal law would allow a suit on these claims.342  
―The Military Personnel Claims Act . . . permitted recovery in some 
circumstances, but it specifically excluded claims of military personnel 
‗incident to their service.‘‖343 
The Court turned to the ―simple, certain, and uniform‖ compensation 
system Congress had created ―for injuries or death of those in armed 
services.‖344  After noting that the compensation system ―requires no 
litigation,‖ and its ―recoveries compare extremely favorably with those 
provided by most workman‘s compensation statutes,‖ it recounted the 
substantial benefits given to Arthur Jefferson and Lt. Col. Griggs‘ estate.345  
The Court found significance in Congress‘ failure to address the 
intersection of the uniform compensation system and the FTCA346: 
                                                      
 337. See id. at 142–43. 
 338. Id. at 143. 
 339. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 340. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947).  See generally supra notes 
165–67 and accompanying text. 
 341. Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. at 305–06 (citing 
Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885))).  
 342. Id. at 144 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 223b (1946). 
 343. Id. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. at 145.  The Court noted that Jefferson had received $3,645.50 at the time of 
trial, and could expect to receive another $31,947, and that Mrs. Griggs could expect to 
receive over $22,000, which was $7,000 more than the maximum permitted for wrongful 
death in Illinois.  Id. 
 346. See id. at 144.  The Court set out four different possibilities:  ―We might say that the 
claimant may (a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b) elect which to pursue, thereby waiving 
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If Congress had contemplated that this Tort Act would be held to apply 
in cases of this kind, it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any 
provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other.  The absence 
of any such adjustment is persuasive that there was no awareness that the 
Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to 
military service.
347
 
The Court held without dissent that the FTCA did not provide a remedy 
for ―injuries to servicemen where the injuries [arose] out of or [were] in the 
course of activity incident to service.‖348  It noted that federal law defined 
the relationship between service members and the government, concluding 
that Congress had not authorized a new cause of action under varying state 
law for injuries or death of service members.349  The Court stated, ―[w]e 
cannot impute to Congress such a radical departure from established law in 
the absence of express congressional command.‖350  
                                                      
the other, or (c) pursue both, crediting the larger liability with the proceeds of the smaller, or 
(d) that the compensation and pension remedy excludes the tort remedy.‖  Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 146 (Justice Douglas did not join the Court‘s opinion but did concur in the 
result).  Courts consider a variety of factors in determining whether a claim arose incident to 
service, with no single factor being dispositive.  See, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 
863, 867 (9th Cir. 2001); Richards v. United States, 176 F.3d 652, 655 (3d Cir. 1999).  
These factors include the following: 
  (1) Whether the injury arose while a service member was on active duty.  See 
Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922, 923–25 (2d Cir. 1982) (soldier shot by fellow 
soldier); Chambers v. United States, 357 F.2d 224, 226–27 (8th Cir. 1966) (airman 
drowned in base swimming pool). 
  (2) Whether the injury arose on a military situs.  See Morey v. United States, 
903 F.2d 880, 881–82 (1st Cir. 1990) (sailor fell off pier where his ship was 
docked); Millang v. United States, 817 F.2d 533, 534–35 (9th Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam) (off-duty marine run over by on-duty military police officer on military 
installation).  But see Dreier v. United States, 106 F.3d 844, 852 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(ruling that the situs of the injury was not determinative). 
  (3) Whether the injury arose during a military activity.  See Costo, 248 F.3d at 
864, 868 (sailors drowned while participating in Navy-led recreational rafting trip); 
Galligan v. City of Phila., 156 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473–74 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (West 
Point cadet injured while attending an Army-Navy football game).  
  (4) Whether the service member was taking advantage of a privilege or 
enjoying a benefit conferred as a result of military service.  See Rayner v. United 
States, 760 F.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (soldier injured during 
elective surgery at military hospital); Herreman v. United States, 476 F.2d 234, 235 
(7th Cir. 1973) (National Guardsman passenger on military flight).  
  (5) Whether the injury arose while the service member was subject to military 
discipline or control.  See Pringle v. United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1222, 1226–27 
(10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (soldier injured when ejected from on-base social 
club under the operational control of base commander); Stewart v. United States, 
90 F.3d 102, 104–05 (4th Cir. 1996) (soldier injured in on-post automobile accident 
while returning to quarters after mandatory physical training). 
 349. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
 350. Id.  
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C. Subsequent Supreme Court Decisions related to the Feres Doctrine 
This section briefly summarizes the Supreme Court‘s decisions that deal 
with the Feres doctrine and the related body of law declining to recognize 
constitutional torts arising from military relationships.  This short review is 
provided to facilitate discussion of the criticisms that have been directed at 
the Feres decision. 
1. United States v. Brown 
In United States v. Brown,351 the Supreme Court held that Feres does not 
bar claims of veterans that arise after they have left military service.352  
Noting that the veteran was injured in a Veterans‘ Administration hospital 
seven years after his discharge, the Court explained that ―[t]he injury . . . 
was not incurred while [Brown] was on active duty or subject to military 
discipline.  The injury occurred after his discharge, while he enjoyed a 
civilian status.‖353  The Court concluded that this injury did not arise 
incident-to-service and was not barred by Feres.354  In reaching such a 
conclusion, the Court explained its Feres decision, stating: 
The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the 
effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme 
results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed 
for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of 
military duty, led the Court to read that Act as excluding claims of that 
character.
355
 
Justices Reed and Minton joined in Justice Black‘s dissent.356 
2. Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States 
In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States,357 the Court 
considered a third-party indemnity action against the United States brought 
by the manufacturer of an aircraft ejection system that injured a National 
Guard pilot.358  The issue was complicated by the holding in United States 
v. Yellow Cab Co.359 that the FTCA allows third party actions against the 
                                                      
 351. 348 U.S. 110 (1954). 
 352. Id. at 113. 
 353. Id. at 112. 
 354. Id. at 113. 
 355. Id. at 112. 
 356. Id. at 113 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black argued, ―[w]e have previously held, 
I think correctly, that a soldier injured in a hospital cannot also sue for damages under the 
Tort Claims Act. . . .  To permit a veteran to recover damages . . . seems like an unjustifiable 
discrimination which the Act does not require.‖  Id. at 114. 
 357. 431 U.S. 666 (1977). 
 358. Id. at 667. 
 359. 340 U.S. 543 (1951). 
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United States for indemnity and contribution.360  Because of the tension 
between Yellow Cab and Feres, the Court found it ―necessary . . . to 
examine the rationale of Feres to determine . . . if . . . [Stencel Aero 
Engineering Corp.‘s] claim would circumvent the purposes of the Act.‖361  
The Court recounted Feres‘ point that the government‘s relationship to its 
service members ―is unlike any relationship between private individuals,‖ 
creating ―at least a surface anomaly in applying‖ the FTCA‘s private 
person liability requirement.362  It identified three rationales or factors for 
Feres‘ conclusion that Congress had not intended to allow incident-to-
service claims: 
 First, the relationship between the Government and members of its 
Armed Forces is ―‗distinctively federal in character‘‖ . . . .  Second, the 
Veterans‘ Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort liability, a 
statutory ―no fault‖ compensation scheme which provides generous 
pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence 
attributable to the Government. . . .  [T]hird[,] . . . the peculiar and 
special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the 
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that 
might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for 
negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of 
military duty . . . .
363
 
It then addressed each rationale.364  It concluded that ―[t]he factors 
considered by the Feres court are largely applicable in this type of case as 
well,‖ and that suit was barred.365  
Justice Marshall filed a dissent, in which Justice Brennan concurred, 
stating:  ―I cannot agree that that narrow, judicially created exception to the 
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Act should be extended to 
any category of litigation other than suits against the Government by 
active-duty servicemen based on injuries incurred while on duty.‖366 
                                                      
 360. Stencel Aero Eng’g Corp., 431 U.S. at 669–70 (citing Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. 543, 
and explaining its holding). 
 361. Id. at 670. 
 362. Id. at 670–71 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 
141–42 (1950)). 
 363. Id. at 671–72 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 364. Id. at 672–73 (finding that the government-federal contractor relationship is federal, 
the military compensation system ―provides an upper limit‖ to the government‘s potential 
liability, and trial of the contractor‘s suit would have the same effect on military discipline 
as a suit by the airman, involving second-guessing orders and testimony by service members 
about one another‘s decisions). 
 365. Id. at 674. 
 366. Id. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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3. Chappell v. Wallace 
In Chappell v. Wallace,367 the Supreme Court unanimously held that no 
cause of action existed under the Constitution for tort suits by service 
members against other service members.368  Five sailors alleged that seven 
of their superior officers had discriminated against them because of their 
race.369  The Court reasoned that a Constitutional cause of action will not 
be recognized when ―‗special factors counseling hesitation‘ are present,‖370 
and that ―[t]he ‗special factors‘ that bear on the propriety of respondents‘ 
Bivens action also formed the basis of this Court‘s decision in Feres.‖371  
These factors or rationales included ―the unique relationship between the 
Government and military personnel,‖ the uniform compensation system, 
and the disruption such suits would have on military discipline.372  The 
Court declined to recognize a Constitutional cause of action under these 
circumstances because ―‗special factors counseling hesitation‘ [were] 
present‖ in that Congress had appropriately regulated the military and the 
rights of service members,373 and ―‗courts are ill-equipped to determine the 
impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority 
might have.‘‖374 
4. United States v. Shearer 
In United States v. Shearer,375 the Supreme Court expanded the Feres 
doctrine to encompass situations other than claims that met the traditional 
incident-to-service test,376 holding that Feres barred an FTCA suit against 
the government for the off-base, off-duty murder of one service member by 
                                                      
 367. 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
 368. Id. at 305. 
 369. Id. at 297. 
 370. Id. at 298 (citing Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983); Carlson v. Green, 446 
U.S. 14, 18 (1980); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)). 
 371. Id.  
 372. Id. at 299.  The Court stated: 
As the Court has since recognized, ―[i]n the last analysis, Feres seems best 
explained by the ‗peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, 
[and] the effects on the maintenance of such suits on discipline . . . .‘‖  United 
States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963), quoting United States v. Brown, 348 
U.S. 110, 112 (1954). . . .  Although this case concerns the limitations on the type 
of non-statutory damages remedy recognized in Bivens, rather than Congress‘ 
intent in enacting the [FTCA], the Court‘s analysis in Feres guides our analysis in 
this case. 
Id. (alterations in original) (citations omitted).  
 373. Id. at 298, 302–04. 
 374. Id. at 305 (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military,  
37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187 (1962)). 
 375. 473 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 376. See supra notes 365–369 (discussing incident-to-service test). 
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another, even though the government knew that the murderer had been 
convicted of a prior manslaughter overseas.377  The plaintiff alleged 
government negligence because ―although the Army knew that [the 
murderer] was dangerous, it ‗negligently and carelessly failed to exert a 
reasonably sufficient control over‘ him and ‗failed to warn other persons 
that he was at large.‘‖378   
The Court reasoned that the crux of the Feres doctrine is the ―peculiar 
and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the 
maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might 
obtain if suits . . . were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts 
committed in the course of military duty.‖379  It concluded that the 
plaintiff‘s allegation of negligent personnel practices relating to the 
murderer and the Army‘s failure to warn others about him ―[struck] at the 
core of these concerns.‖380  Any suit would ―call[] into question basic 
choices about the discipline, supervision, and control of a serviceman,‖ and 
require ―commanding officers . . . to convince a civilian court of the 
wisdom of a wide range of [‗complex, subtle, and professional‘] military 
and disciplinary decisions.‖381  The Court ruled that these claims, like those 
in Feres and Stencel, ―were the type of claims that, if generally permitted, 
would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of 
military discipline and effectiveness.‖382  It held that such claims were 
outside what Congress had authorized when it enacted the FTCA.383  The 
eight justices deciding the case concurred in the Court‘s analysis of the 
Feres issue.384 
5. United States v. Johnson 
In United States v. Johnson,385 the Supreme Court held that the Feres 
doctrine barred a tort suit by members of the Coast Guard injured in a 
                                                      
 377. Shearer, 473 U.S. at 53–54, 59.  Shearer also addressed the FTCA‘s assault and 
battery exception.  Id. at 54–57 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1982)).  That discussion is 
not relevant to this paper. 
 378. Id. at 54. 
 379. Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 
150, 162 (1963) (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954))). 
 380. Id. at 58.  The Court added in a footnote that, ―[a]lthough no longer controlling, 
other factors mentioned in Feres are present here.  It would be anomalous for the 
Government‘s duty to supervise servicemen to depend on the local law of the various states, 
and the record shows that Private Shearer‘s dependents are entitled to statutory veterans‘ 
benefits.‖  Id. at 58 n.4 (citations omitted). 
 381. Id. at 58 (citations omitted). 
 382. Id. at 59. 
 383. See id. 
 384. See id. at 59–60 (Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens concurred in Part II-B 
regarding the Feres opinion, and Justice Marshall also concurred separately in Part II-B). 
 385. 481 U.S. 681 (1987). 
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helicopter crash during a rescue mission although the tortfeasor, an FAA 
air traffic controller, was not a member of the military.386  Rejecting an 
Eleventh Circuit test that provided ―when negligence is alleged on the part 
of a Federal Government employee who is not a member of the 
military, . . . the propriety of a suit should be determined by examining the 
rationales that underlie the Feres doctrine,‖387 the Court reaffirmed its 
Feres holding that the FTCA does not encompass claims ―for injuries that 
[arose] out of or [were] in the course of activity incident to service.‖388  It 
also rejected the argument that the civilian nature of the tortfeasor was 
relevant to that inquiry.389  The Court found that the three broad rationales 
for the Feres doctrine applied to the Johnson facts390:  the distinctively 
federal nature of the military relationship between service members and the 
government;391 the congressionally-established system of ―generous 
statutory disability and death benefits‖;392 and the disruption of military 
discipline and ―commitment essential to effective service‖ that would flow 
from allowing tort suits by service members.393   
It noted that Johnson had been on a rescue mission as part of his military 
service and in his military status, that his wife had received administrative 
compensation, and that any suit would likely raise military discipline 
issues.394  Accordingly, the case came ―within the heart of the Feres 
doctrine as it consistently ha[d] been articulated.‖395 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined in Justice Scalia‘s 
dissent.396  Justice Scalia argued that, with the exception of the military 
discipline concern first noted in Brown, the Court had disavowed the 
rationales it had identified in support of the Feres decision, and that they 
did not justify the result.397  He argued that the ―parallel private liability‖ 
rationale failed because it would render superfluous some explicit 
exceptions to the FTCA that involve purely federal activities, such as postal 
matters and combatant activities, and because the Court had subsequently 
                                                      
 386. Id. at 682–83, 692. 
 387. Id. at 684. 
 388. Id. at 686 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (―This Court has 
never deviated from this characterization of the Feres bar.‖). 
 389. Id. at 686–88. 
 390. Id. at 688. 
 391. Id. at 689 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (quoting United States 
v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947))). 
 392. Id. (citing UNIFORMED SERVICES ALMANAC (L. Sharff & S. Gordon eds., 1985)). 
 393. Id. at 690–91 (citing United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52 (1985)).   
 394. Id. at 691–92. 
 395. Id. at 692. 
 396. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 397. Id. at 693–95. 
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rejected the ―parallel private liability‖ requirement.398  He also criticized 
the second rationale, that claims arising within the distinctively federal 
military relationship should not be judged by state tort law.399  Justice 
Scalia reasoned it was more unfair to deny service members any recovery 
than it was to subject them to varying state laws; the purported ―need for 
uniformity‖ was belied by allowing civilians, prisoners,400 and 
―servicemen . . . [injured] not incident to service‖ to sue; and ―it [was] 
difficult to explain why uniformity . . . [was] indispensable for the military, 
but not for the many other federal departments and agencies.‖401  He argued 
that the third rationale—the existence of a uniform compensation system—
was undermined because the Court had allowed FTCA suits by veterans 
and service members for injuries that were not incurred incident to service 
even though both veterans and service members receive administrative 
compensation.402  He further noted that the Court had recognized that 
neither the Veterans Benefit Act nor the FTCA provided that remedies 
under the veterans‘ statute were exclusive.403  Finally, Justice Scalia argued 
that Feres‘ attempt ―to make ‗the entire statutory system of remedies 
against the Government . . . a workable, consistent and equitable whole,‘‖ 
had failed,404 and that ―‗[t]here [was] no justification for this Court to read 
exemptions into the Act beyond those provided by Congress.‘‖405 
6. United States v. Stanley 
In United States v. Stanley,406 a former soldier alleged that his 
constitutional rights were violated when he unwittingly participated in an 
LSD drug testing program during his military service.407  The Court 
reaffirmed its conclusion in Chappell that no constitutional tort remedy was 
available when a service member‘s injury arose out of or in the course of 
activity incident-to-service, and clarified that the holding applied even 
                                                      
 398. Id. (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957); Indian Towing 
Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955)). 
 399. Id. at 695–96. 
 400. Id. at 695–96 (―We have abandoned this peculiar rule of solicitude in allowing 
federal prisoners (who have no more control over their geographical location than 
servicemen) to recover under the FTCA for injuries caused by the negligence of prison 
authorities.‖ (citing United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 162 (1963))). 
 401. Id. (quoting Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
 402. Id. at 697–98 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949); United States 
v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 (1951)). 
 403. Id. at 697 (citing Brooks, 337 U.S. at 53). 
 404. Id. at 701 (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139 (1950)). 
 405. Id. at 702 (quoting Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957)). 
 406. 483 U.S. 669 (1987). 
 407. Id. at 671–72. 
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though suit had been brought against government employees other than the 
plaintiff‘s superior officers.408  The same ―‗special factors counseling 
hesitation [in Chappell]‘—‘the unique disciplinary structure of the Military 
Establishment and Congress‘ activity in the field,‘‖ counseled hesitation in 
Stanley.409  The Court found ―no reason‖ to adopt a different test for service 
members‘ claims for constitutional torts than for FTCA suits.410  The Court 
held that Stanley had no constitutional cause of action because his claim 
arose incident to his military service.411  The majority opinion, written by 
Justice Scalia, did not address Stanley‘s FTCA claims against the United 
States, other than to reject them on procedural grounds as not within the 
interlocutory order that was appealed to the circuit court.412   
Justice O‘Connor concurred in part and dissented in part.413  While 
agreeing that service members had no remedy for constitutional torts that 
arise incident to military service, she would have recognized a 
constitutional cause of action where ―conduct of the type alleged in 
[Stanley was] so far beyond the bounds of human decency that as a matter 
of law it simply cannot be considered a part of the military mission.‖414 
Justice Brennan wrote a separate dissent, joined by Justice Marshall and 
in part by Justice Stevens.415  Justice Brennan argued that the majority had 
inappropriately granted absolute immunity to the civilian officials who had 
violated Stanley‘s rights,416 and improperly expanded the holding of 
Wallace v. Chappell.417  He urged, in the absence of a command 
relationship or clear showing that military discipline would be 
                                                      
 408. Id. at 680–81 (citations omitted). 
 409. Id. at 683–84 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)). 
 410. Id. at 681–83.  The Court stated: 
A test for liability that depends on the extent to which particular suits would call 
into question military discipline and decisionmaking would itself require judicial 
inquiry into, and hence intrusion upon, military matters.  Whether a case implicates 
those concerns would often be problematic, raising the prospect of compelled 
depositions and trial testimony by military officers concerning the details of their 
military commands.  Even putting aside the risk of erroneous judicial conclusions 
(which would becloud military decisionmaking), the mere process of arriving at 
correct conclusions would disrupt the military regime.  The ―incident to service‖ 
test, by contrast, provides a line that is relatively clear and that can be discerned 
with less extensive inquiry into military matters.  
Id. at 682–83. 
 411. Id. at 680. 
 412. Id. at 676–78.  Both dissents concurred in this result.  Id. at 686 n.1 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 708 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 413. Id. at 708 (O‘Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 414. Id. at 708–10. 
 415. Id. at 686 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 416. Id. at 693–98. 
 417. Id. at 700–02. 
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undermined,418 that no factor counseled hesitation to the recognition of a 
constitutional cause of action on these facts.419 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT‘S FERES DECISION 
This Part analyzes the Feres decision and the criticisms directed at it.  It 
evaluates the Court‘s reasoning and the factors that support its conclusion.  
It then considers the criticisms of the opinion, including those that directly 
challenge the reasoning of Feres, and those that independently object to its 
analysis.  Finally, it addresses characterizations of the Feres decision as 
judicially creating an exception to the FTCA, usurping the role of 
Congress, and fostering injustice. 
A. Evaluating the Feres Conclusion 
The historical circumstances and the state of the law when Congress 
enacted the Legislative Reform Act of 1946 provide substantial support for 
Feres‘ conclusion that Congress did not intend for the FTCA to cover 
claims arising from injuries to service-members incident-to-service.  The 
single issue before the Court in Feres was ―whether the Tort Claims Act 
extend[ed] its remedy to one sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what under 
other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.‖420  The Court 
approached its task with the stated purpose of deciding that issue in 
accordance with what Congress intended.421  The task was difficult because 
there was no definitive legislative history on the issue.422 
The Court laid out a strong affirmative case for the proposition that when 
Congress enacted the FTCA it did not intend to allow suit for injuries that 
were incurred incident to military service.  The opinion reviewed the ―long 
effort‖ that led to the enactment of the FTCA.423  It recognized that a key 
purpose of the Act was to relieve Congress of the burden of private bills, 
but noted that private bills on behalf of service members were not a 
significant part of that problem.424  The Court explained that the courts are 
―to determine whether any claim is recognizable in law.‖425  It noted that 
the text of the FTCA subjected the government to liability only ―‗to the 
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,‘‖  and that no 
                                                      
 418. Id. at 703–06. 
 419. Id. at 706–08. 
 420. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
 421. Id. at 138, 146. 
 422. Id. at 138. 
 423. Id. at 139.  
 424. Id. at 140. 
 425. Id. at 141–42. 
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American precedent supported liability under circumstances akin to those 
of the government-service member relationship.426  The Court addressed 
the FTCA‘s jurisdictional requirement that liability be assessed under the 
substantive state tort law of the place of the wrongful act, noted that state 
tort law and workers‘ compensation law vary widely, and concluded that it 
would not have been rational to subject claims brought against the federal 
government by members of its military to such varied rules.427  The Court 
spoke to the ―distinctively federal‖ relationship between the government 
and service members that is ―fundamentally derived from federal sources 
and governed by federal authority,‖ and noted that federal law did not 
provide ―a recovery such as plaintiffs seek‖ because the Military Personnel 
Claims Act ―specifically excluded claims of military personnel ‗incident to 
their service.‘‖428  It addressed the ―simple, certain, and uniform‖ 
compensation programs Congress had created for veterans and service 
members and reasoned that, had Congress intended for service members to 
recover under the FTCA, it would have directed how a tort recovery would 
or would not alter the administrative remedy.429   
Although not mentioned in its opinion, the Feres Court was aware of a 
significant body of law that held that service members could not bring suit 
for in-service injuries under statutes that waived the United States‘ tort 
sovereign immunity in specific circumstances.  Second Circuit decisions in 
1928430 and 1945431 (the latter written by Judge Learned Hand) held that the 
Public Vessels Act did not authorize service members to sue for in-service 
injuries even though the language of the statute did not exclude such 
liability432:  
If it had been the purpose to change that policy as respects officers and 
seamen of the navy injured by the unseaworthiness of a public vessel, or 
by the fault of one another, because that is what in the end it comes to, 
we cannot think it would have been left to such general language . . . .
433
   
A similar line of cases barred suits seeking compensation for in-service 
injuries to service members under the Railroad Control Act‘s waiver of 
federal sovereign immunity.434  This body of law was presented to the 
                                                      
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. at 142–43. 
 428. Id. at 143–44 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301,  
305–06 (1947) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (Supp. IV 1946); Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 
(1885); Tarble‘s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871)). 
 429. Id. at 144–45. 
 430. Dobson v. United States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928). 
 431. Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 432. Id. at 743; Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809. 
 433. Dobson, 27 F.2d at 809. 
 434. See Sandoval v. Davis, 278 F. 968, 969–970 (N.D. Ohio 1922), aff’d per curiam, 
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Court in Feres435 and Brooks.436  The Court alluded to it in the Brooks 
opinion.437 
One other factor strongly supports the Court‘s conclusion.  Throughout 
the legislative build-up to the enactment of the FTCA, Congress had 
contemplated that any general tort claims bill would place caps or limits on 
the damages that could be recovered.  Many of the bills proposed in the 
1920s and 1930s included maximum amounts to be paid.438  Up to the eve 
of the FTCA‘s enactment, the legislative proposals of the 1940s limited 
damages to $7,500 or $10,000.439  President Roosevelt‘s 1942 proposal 
included a limit of $7,500.440  Payments under the military compensation 
system were substantially higher than these limits.441  Because it had 
already provided service members with an assured, no-fault administrative 
remedy that was larger than the tort remedy under consideration, it is 
unlikely that Congress intended to allow service members to also pursue a 
tort remedy under the FTCA. 
On the face of its opinion and unanimous holding, the Court made a 
compelling explanation why ―Congress, in drafting this Act, [had not] 
                                                      
288 F. 56 (6th Cir. 1923); Seidel v. Dir. Gen. of R.Rs., 89 So. 308 (La. 1921); Moon v. 
Hines, 87 So. 603 (Ala. 1921). 
 435. U.S. Griggs Br., supra note 274, at 14–19. 
 436. U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60, at 6, 10–18. 
 437. Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 52 (1949). 
 438. See S. 1043, 74th Cong. §§ 1(a), 202(b) (1935) ($50,000 for property; $7500 for 
personal injury or death); S. 1833, 73d Cong. §§ 1(a)–(b), 201(a), 202(b) (1933) ($50,000 
for property; $7,500 for personal injury or death); H.R. 129, 73d Cong.  
§ 2(b)(1) (1933) ($50,000 for property; $10,000 for personal injury or death);  
S. 4567, 72d Cong. §§ 1(a)–(b), 201(a), 202(b) (1932) (same); S. 211, 72d Cong.  
§§ 1(a), (c), 201(a), 202(b) (1931) (same); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. §§ 1(a), (c), 203(b)(3) 
(1931) ($50,000 for property; $10,000 for personal injury or death);  
H.R. 17168, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 201(a) (1931) ($50,000 for property; $7,500 for personal 
injury or death);  H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. §§ 1, 21(a) (1931) (same); H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. 
§§ 1(a), 201(a), 202(a) (1930) (same); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 1(a), (201)(a), 202(a) (1930) 
(same); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 4, 201(a), 202(a) (1928) ($10,000 for property; $7,500 for 
personal injury or death); S. 1912, 69th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (1926) ($5,000 for property and 
personal injury or death); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. §§ 4, 204(a)(5), 204(b)(3) (1926) ($10,000 
for property; $5,000 for total disability or death); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 5 (1925) ($5000 
for personal injury or death).  Four bills of that era did not cap damages.  See H.R. 2028, 
74th Cong. (1935);  
H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179, 68th Cong. 
(1925). 
 439. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463, supra note 20, at 2 ($7,500); H.R. 
REP. NO. 79-1287, at 4 (1945) ($10,000); S. REP. NO. 77-1196, at 2, 6 (1942) ($10,000); 
H.R. REP. NO. 76-2428, at 4 (1940) ($7,500). 
 440. See H.R. DOC. NO. 77-562, at 2 (1942) ($7,500).   
 441. See, e.g., Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950) (noting that Arthur 
Jefferson had received $3,645 in government benefits prior to trial and could expect to 
receive another $31,947, and that Mrs. Griggs could expect to receive over $22,000 in 
government benefits); S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 1–3 (1948) (noting monthly payments of $168 
made to Lee Jones Cardy‘s wife and mother following his 1944 death). 
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created a new cause of action dependent on local law for service-connected 
injuries or death due to negligence.‖442  It could not ―impute to Congress 
such a radical departure from established law in the absence of express 
congressional command.‖443  The Court correctly found that Congress did 
not intend for the FTCA to allow service members to sue for injuries that 
arose incident to military service.444  
B. Arguments Against the Feres Decision 
Opponents of Feres raise a number of criticisms of the decision.445  
Some directly attack the Court‘s explanation.  Others raise independent 
reasons why the Court must be considered mistaken.  A third set 
characterizes the decision in pejorative terms. 
1. Direct Challenges to  Feres’ Line of Analysis 
a. The FTCA Requires Comparable Private Person Parallel Liability 
In Feres the Court concluded, ―plaintiffs can point to no liability of a 
‗private individual‘ even remotely analogous to that which they are 
asserting against the United States.‖446  This conclusion has been 
challenged on the ground that the military does things that private 
individuals do, and ―[a]pplying the Court‘s logic, because private entities 
can be held liable for negligent provision of medical, legal, retail, 
transportation, and recreational services, the United States could, similarly, 
be liable for the negligent provision of such services.‖447  This argument 
falls into the logical trap of finding ―analogous private liability‖ by 
considering only some circumstances and ignoring ―the status of both the 
wronged and the wrongdoer.‖448  The Court addressed and rejected this 
argument because liability under the FTCA ―is that created by ‗all the 
                                                      
 442. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 146. 
 443. See id.  Justice Douglas concurred in the result.   
 444. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, §§ 1-5A, 5A.05 (―There is little 
evidence that Feres incorrectly determined Congressional intent on the matter . . . .‖); see 
also Gregory C. Sisk, Teaching Litigation with the Federal Government, 49 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
275, 287 (1999) (arguing that ―the Feres Court was probably correct [fifty years ago] in 
divining the mood of the times, confirming . . . that era‘s [deference] toward military 
demands and the military command structure, and recognizing that Congress very likely 
would have excepted military personnel from the [Act] . . . had it anticipated . . . such 
claims‖). 
 445. This article responds to those arguments that are most prominent or recent. 
 446. 340 U.S. at 141. 
 447. Dierdre G. Brou, Alternatives to the Judicially Promulgated Feres Doctrine,  
192 MIL. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2007).  
 448. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142. 
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circumstances,‘ not that which a few of the circumstances might create.‖449  
Tort liability often turns on the particular relationship between the plaintiff 
and the defendant.450 
In his Johnson dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Feres was mistaken to 
recognize an FTCA parallel private liability requirement.451  First, he 
argued such a requirement would mean that some of the FTCA‘s 
exceptions were ―superfluous, since private individuals typically do not, for 
example, transmit postal matter, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), collect taxes or 
customs duties, § 2680(c), impose quarantines, § 2680(f), or regulate the 
monetary system, § 2680(i).‖452  Second, he argued the Court had 
subsequently rejected any ―‗parallel private liability‘ requirement.‖453   
The former argument fails because the FTCA does include redundant 
defenses.  For example, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) bars claims arising from both 
―misrepresentation‖ and ―deceit,‖ and the discretionary function exception 
of § 2680(a) would bar any claim arising from either ―the imposition . . . of 
a quarantine,‖ protected by § 2680(f), or ―the regulation of the monetary 
system,‖ protected by  
§ 2680(i).454  Nor was it irrational for Congress to include overlapping 
defenses.455   
The latter argument fails because the ―private person‖ liability 
requirement is a textual part of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), the FTCA‘s 
jurisdictional grant.456  As the Court recognized in Feres, one of its tasks 
was to determine whether a ―claim is recognizable in law.‖457  In FDIC v. 
Meyer,458 the Court analyzed the language of the jurisdictional grant in very 
similar terms: 
                                                      
 449. Id.  
 450. See, e.g., Matheny v. United States, 469 F.3d 1093, 1094–95 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(finding that the Indiana Recreational Use Statute foreclosed recovery by a visitor injured 
while sled-riding in a national park); Leigh v. NASA, 860 F.2d 652, 652–53 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that the Louisiana statutory employer doctrine barred suit by employee of a 
subcontractor injured while testing an external tank of the space shuttle). 
 451. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694–95 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), (c), (f), (i) (1982)).   
 452. See id. at 694. 
 453. Id. at 694–95 (citing Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957); 
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 66–69 (1955)). 
 454. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (f), (h), (i) (2006). 
 455. Certainly the Postal Exception, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2006), is not superfluous when 
juxtaposed with the private person liability requirement.  The government is still liable for 
negligently leaving mail in a hazardous spot.  See Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 U.S. 481, 
489–92 (2006). 
 456. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
 457. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 141 (1950).   
 458. 510 U.S. 471 (1994). 
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 Section 1346(b) grants the federal district courts jurisdiction over a 
certain category of claims for which the United States has waived its 
sovereign immunity and ―render[ed]‖ itself liable.  Richards v. United 
States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 . . . (1962).  This category includes claims that are:  
 ―[1] against the United States, [2] for money damages, . . .  
[3] for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death  
[4] caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee 
of the Government [5] while acting within the scope of his office or 
employment, [6] under circumstances where the United States, if a 
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the 
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.‖  28 U.S.C. § 
1346(b). 
 A claim comes within this jurisdictional grant—and thus is 
―cognizable‖ under § 1346(b)—if it is actionable under § 1346(b).  And 
a claim is actionable under § 1346(b) if it alleges the six elements 
outlined above.
459
 
Thus, private person liability is an element of any FTCA claim.460  Where a 
private person might perform the same task, that requirement can be met.461  
But where an activity is not something a private person could do, the 
requirement for private person liability cannot be met and the claim is not 
cognizable under the FTCA.462  
                                                      
 459. Id. at 477 (alterations in original). 
 460. See id. at 477–78 (holding that § 1346(b) does not waive sovereign immunity for 
constitutional tort claims because ―federal law, not state law, provides the source of liability 
for a claim alleging the deprivation of a federal constitutional right‖);  
H.R. REP. NO. 79-1287, at 5 (1945); see also United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43, 44 (2005) 
(recognizing that § 1346(b)(1) waives sovereign immunity under circumstances where the 
United States if a private person, rather than the United States if a state or municipal entity, 
would be liable and that the Court had consistently adhered to the private person standard).  
See generally Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (citing § 1346(b)) (holding that because 
the jurisdictional grant is for claims for a ―negligent or wrongful act or omission,‖ claims for 
strict or absolute liability cannot be brought under the FTCA)); Peak v. Small Bus. Admin., 
660 F.2d 375, 378 (8th Cir. 1981) (―The holding in Laird did not indicate that such claims 
are not governed by the provisions of the FTCA, but simply that they are barred by the 
provisions of the FTCA. The practical effect . . . is the same as if Congress had included it 
as an exemption under section 2680.‖).  
 461. See Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 315, 319 (1957) (negligence by 
people fighting forest fire); Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61,  
61–62, 66–69 (1955) (failure to keep lighthouse repaired). 
 462.  C.P. Chem. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d 34, 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1987) (barring suit 
challenging ban on formaldehyde-emitting foam insulation and stating that the plain 
meaning of § 1346(b) is that the United States cannot be held liable if there is no 
comparable cause of action against a private citizen); Jayvee Brand, Inc. v. United States, 
721 F.2d 385, 387, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (affirming dismissal of suit by pajama 
manufacturers challenging ban on flame retardant because a quasi-legislative or quasi-
adjudicative action by an agency of the federal government is not the type of action that 
private persons could engage in); Pate v. United States, 328 F. Supp. 2d 62, 63, 76 (D.D.C. 
2004) (barring suit alleging U.S. Parole Commission failed to hold hearings in conformity 
with its regulations); see also Dorking Genetics v. United States, 76 F.3d 1261, 1264 (2d 
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Finally, some critics have asserted that the Court erred in discussing 
private person liability by ―ignor[ing] other provisions of the FTCA . . . 
which opened to liability a number of areas where parallel private rights of 
action did not previously exist, including the ‗transmi[ssion of] postal 
matter, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b), collect[ion of] taxes or custom duties, § 
2680(c), impos[ition of] quarantines,  
§ 2680(f), [and regulation of] the monetary system, § 2680(i).‘‖463  This 
assertion is apparently based on a misreading of Justice Scalia‘s argument 
that a private person liability requirement would render some of the 
FTCA‘s exceptions superfluous because they protected purely 
governmental activity.464  The cited provisions, 28 U.S.C.  
§§ 2680(b), (c), (f), and (i) are exceptions to the FTCA‘s general waiver of 
sovereign immunity.465  As such, they do the opposite of opening the 
United States to liability for transmitting postal matter, collecting taxes, 
imposing quarantines, or regulating the monetary system:  they exclude 
such claims from the FTCA. 
b. State Law and the Federal Relationship between Service Members 
and the United States 
Feres supported its conclusion that Congress did not intend to include 
claims arising incident-to-service by noting that ―[i]t would hardly be a 
rational plan‖ to have claims of service members decided under widely 
varying state law, as the FTCA would require, when the relationship 
between service members and the government was ―distinctively 
federal.‖466  In response it is argued that the FTCA itself burdens the 
military relationship with state tort law:  
                                                      
Cir. 1996) (barring suit alleging government failure to stop export of diseased cattle and 
holding that the breach of such a duty, assuming it existed, is not cognizable under the 
FTCA); Art Metal-U.S.A., Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151, 1152–55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(barring suit alleging that the General Services Administration failed to follow government 
regulations when it debarred plaintiff from federal contracts). 
 463. Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 874 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) 
(alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)); see also Turley, supra note 9, at 16 (noting the same examples and stating 
that ―[w]hile the Feres Court relied on the fact that there was no parallel private right of 
action where service members could sue their employer, ‗[t]his ignores other provisions of 
the FTCA . . . which opened to liability a number of areas where parallel private rights of 
action did not previously exist‘‖ (alterations in original) (quoting Costo, 248 F.3d at 874)). 
 464. Johnson v. United States, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2680 (b), (c), (f), (i) (1982)).   
 465. Section 2680 begins, ―Exceptions:  The provisions of this chapter and section 
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to— . . . .‖  28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006). 
 466. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950) (quoting United States v. Standard 
Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 305 (1947)).  The Court reasoned: 
That the geography of an injury should select the law to be applied to his tort 
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 State law . . . intrudes upon the relationship between the Government 
and its armed forces [because] when civilians sue . . . for injuries 
inflicted by . . . service members[,] [s]tate law . . . provid[es] the 
substantive tort law to establish the United States‘ [FTCA] liability for 
its employees‘ actions. . . . Civilians sue under the [FTCA] and, as a 
result, . . . service members face tort liability.  Because tort law varies 
from state to state, this can lead to varying tort standards for  . . . service 
members.
467
 
This argument fails for three reasons.  First, service members would not 
face tort liability because the FTCA specifically grants immunity to all 
federal employees for any tort that is cognizable under the Act.468  Second, 
leaving aside the service members‘ immunity, in an FTCA suit for service 
member negligence, the service member and the United States would both 
be on the defense side, with no strain on their relationship caused by 
varying state tort law.  Third, the argument does not address the Court‘s 
point:  absent some strong indication to the contrary, it is unlikely that 
Congress would have set up a system where similar members of the 
military exposed to the same danger and suffering similar injuries would 
receive widely varying remedies under state tort law.469   
Justice Scalia argues: 
 [I]t is difficult to explain why uniformity (assuming our rule were 
achieving it) is indispensable for the military, but not for the many other 
federal departments and agencies that can be sued under the FTCA for 
the negligent performance of their ―unique, nationwide function[s],‖ . . . 
including, as we have noted, the federal prison system which may be 
sued under varying state laws by its inmates.
470
  
                                                      
claims makes no sense.  We cannot ignore the fact that most states have abolished 
the common-law action for damages between employer and employee and 
superseded it with workman‘s compensation statutes which provide, in most 
instances, the sole basis of liability. 
Id.  
 467. Brou, supra note 447, at 40–41. 
 468. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006). 
 469. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 142–44.  In Molsbergen v. United States, 757 F.2d 1016 (9th 
Cir. 1985), the court held that state law determines whether the government owed a duty to 
inform a former soldier that he had been exposed to radiation with thousands of others 
during service, assuming that the government had no notice that radiation was hazardous 
prior to his discharge.  Id. at 1019–20.  Because the service member was domiciled in 
California after discharge, the court determined that California law would apply to claims 
regarding his injury.  Id. at 1020. 
 470. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 696 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Stencel Aero 
Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 675 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)); see also 
Brou, supra note 447, at 41–42.  But see United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149 (1966) 
(holding federal prisoner could not sue under the FTCA for injuries incurred working for 
Prison Industries, Inc.). 
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The answer is that the military needs to be a cohesive organization to a 
much greater extent than other federal agencies and in a categorically 
different way than the Bureau of Prisons:  ―The military constitutes a 
specialized community governed by a separate discipline from that of the 
civilian.‖471  Trust and goodwill among soldiers, sailors, and airmen are 
important to military success.472 
A uniform system of remedies fosters trust and goodwill.  The FTCA 
bars claims that arise in foreign countries473 or in combatant activities.474  If 
three service-member amputees share a military hospital ward—one having 
lost a leg when his helicopter was shot down by the Taliban, one suffering 
the same loss in a military transport accident in Germany, and one in a 
military training flight in Kansas—each of them will have the full panoply 
of service members‘ and veterans‘ benefits.475  Those who suffered their 
loss in combat or overseas could not sue under the FTCA because the Act‘s 
exceptions bar those claims.476  If the one injured in Kansas could bring a 
FTCA suit under Kansas tort law he would have a much larger potential 
remedy, the others would know it, and may well feel unfairly treated.477  
Concern about providing such disparate treatment for similarly situated 
members of the military led President Truman to veto the Cardy private 
relief bill on the day he signed the FTCA into law, stating that ―it would 
grant to the estate a special benefit denied to the estates of other members 
of the armed forces where the facts are similar.‖478  As President 
                                                      
 471. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953); see also United States v. Stanley, 
483 U.S. 669, 679 (1987) (―We found ‗factors counseling hesitation‘ in ‗[t]he need for 
special regulations in relation to military discipline, and the consequent need and 
justification for a special and exclusive system of military justice . . . .‘‖ (alterations in 
original) (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983))). 
 472. See Kathryn R. Burke, The Privacy Penumbra and Adultery:  Does Military 
Necessity Justify an Adultery Regulation and What Will It Take for the Court to Declare It 
Unconstitutional?, 19 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL‘Y 301, 321 (1997); Sam Nunn, The 
Fundamental Principles of the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence in Military Cases, ARMY 
LAW. Jan. 1995, at 27, 28–30.  
 473. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006). 
 474. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006). 
 475. See discussion supra Part I.B(1). 
 476. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), (k) (―The provisions of this chapter . . . shall not apply to . 
. . [a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military . . . or 
 . . . [a]ny claim arising in a foreign country.‖). 
 477. See Edwin F. Hornbrook & Eugene J. Kirschbaum, The Feres Doctrine:  Here 
Today—Gone Tomorrow?, 33 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11 (1990) (―[A]bolishing Feres would splinter 
military cohesion by creating a privileged class of claimants who could bring suit, and an 
underprivileged class who would still be barred by the combat, foreign country, and 
discretionary function exceptions.‖).  See generally United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 
844 (4th Cir. 1948) (hypothesizing the disparate treatment that similarly-situated soldiers 
might nonetheless receive under the FTCA), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949).  
 478. S. DOC. NO. 80-179, at 2–3 (1948) (returning without approval the bill entitled ―An 
Act for the Relief of the Estate of Lee Jones Cardy‖); see supra notes  
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Eisenhower stated in a similar veto message, ―[u]niformity and equality of 
treatment to all who are similarly situated must be the steadfast rule if the 
Federal programs for veterans and their dependents are to be operated 
successfully.‖479  This is why the Court thought it unlikely Congress would 
sub silentio create a new, non-uniform remedy for those injured incident-
to-service.480 
c. The Military Compensation System & The Federal Tort Claims 
Act  
The Feres Court found it significant that Congress, having ―provide[d] 
systems of simple, certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death 
of those in armed services,‖ failed to state how money received 
administratively would be taken into account if a service member received 
an FTCA judgment.481  The Court recognized four possible approaches 
Congress could have adopted.482  It concluded that ―[t]he absence of any 
such adjustment is persuasive that there was no [Congressional] awareness 
                                                      
125–29 (discussing vetoes of military private bills).   
 479. H.R. DOC. NO. 83-432, at 1–2 (1954) (returning without approval a bill for the relief 
of Mrs. Josette L. St. Marie); see also H.R. DOC. NO. 83-426, at 1–2 (1954) (returning 
without approval a bill for the relief of Theodor W. Carlson). 
 480. One of the lessons of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund is that 
providing different, individualized awards to members of a group who have suffered similar 
loss can cause frustration and ill-will: 
[T]here are serious problems posed by a statutory approach mandating 
individualized awards for each eligible claimant.  The statutory mandate of tailored 
awards fueled divisiveness among claimants and undercut the very cohesion and 
united national response reflected in the Act.  The fireman‘s widow would 
complain:  ―Why am I receiving less money than the stockbroker‘s widow?  My 
husband died a hero.  Why are you demeaning the value of his life?‖ . . .  The 
statutory requirement that each individual claimant‘s award reflect unique financial 
and family circumstances inevitably resulted in finger-pointing and a sense among 
many claimants that the life of their loved one had been demeaned and undervalued 
relative to others also receiving compensation from the Fund. 
KENNETH R. FEINBERG ET AL., U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL 
MASTER FOR THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001 82 (2008) (noting 
that a better approach might have been to provide the same amount for all eligible 
claimants); accord KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?  THE UNPRECEDENTED 
EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 71–73 (2005) (describing his encounters with 
the 9/11 families at town meetings and their reactions of resentment, anger, and disbelief 
when ―faced with the raw truth that each claimant would receive a different award 
depending on the economic wherewithal of the victim‖ because ―[w]idows of firefighters 
and military men . . . [were] receiv[ing] less from the fund than the stockbrokers‘ widows‖).   
 481. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950). 
 482. Id.  The Court noted that a claimant might ―(a) enjoy both types of recovery, or (b) 
elect which to pursue, thereby waiving the other, or (c) pursue both, crediting the larger 
liability with the proceeds of the smaller, or (d) that the compensation and pension remedy 
excludes the tort remedy.‖  Id.   
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that the Act might be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to 
military service.‖483   
Critics have faulted this conclusion, arguing that the Feres bar of claims 
arising ―incident-to-service‖ is much broader than the workers‘ 
compensation laws‘ bar to suits by ―employees injured in accidents that 
arise out of and in the course of employment,‖484 and that ―veterans 
benefits are not as generous as the Court believed them to be.‖485  The first 
argument presumes that the rights of civilians and service members to sue 
their employers should be parallel even though their work connection 
requirements for receiving benefits are categorically different:  one 
compensating injuries arising during ―course of employment‖ and the other 
granting benefits for injuries arising during period of service.486  The 
second argument presents one side of an interminable debate.487  Neither 
argument addresses the Court‘s reasoning that if Congress had anticipated 
                                                      
 483. Id.  The Court then noted that the compensation system compared favorably to 
―most workman‘s compensation statutes‖ and stated the administrative payments made to 
Jefferson and Griggs.  Id. at 145. 
 484. Brou, supra note 447, at 51; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 698 
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that ―[r]ecovery is possible under workers‘ 
compensation statutes more often than under the [Veterans‘ Benefit Act],‖ and that 
―[Veterans‘ Benefit Act] benefits can be terminated more easily than can workers‘ 
compensation‖ benefits); Turley, supra note 9, at 85 (arguing that unlike the Feres doctrine 
which bars suit in non-work related areas, FECA‘s exclusive remedy is confined to work-
related injuries or illnesses and does not bar suits for injuries caused by government 
negligence outside the employment context). 
 485. Brou, supra note 447, at 48. 
 486. See Brou, supra note 447, at 52–53 (touching upon the breadth of military medical 
coverage).  Unlike typical workers‘ compensation statutes, benefits are provided to veterans 
and service members for any injury, disability, or death that arises at any time during their 
period of service, with few exceptions.  See supra Part II.B.1 (identifying the origin and 
scope of the military‘s uniform compensation system).  The liberal standard is reflected in 
the title to the Congressional Act of September 27, 1944, which expanded the scope of the 
benefits program:  ―To repeal [the statute], which provides for the forfeiture of pay of 
persons in the military and naval service . . . who are absent from duty on account of the 
direct effects of venereal disease due to misconduct . . . .‖  Act of September 27, 1944, Pub. 
L. No.  
78-430, 58 Stat. 752.   
 487. Resolving the ―generousness‖ argument would likely turn on the definition chosen.  
Certainly, however, there are two sides to be considered.  Compare Brou, supra note 447, at 
48–51 (arguing that the scope of veterans‘ benefits is limited when compared to the 
recoveries available in typical personal injury cases), with Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra 
note 477, at 11–14 (endorsing the overall equity associated with veterans‘ benefits), and 
Joanne M. Bernott, United States v. Johnson:  The Dissent’s Flawed Attack on Feres v. 
United States, 21 CREIGHTON L. REV. 109, 126 (1987) (arguing that criticisms of the 
exclusive nature of the administrative remedies ―carelessly impugn[] the overall adequacy 
of the military‘s statutory compensation scheme‖).  Any weighing of the generousness of 
veterans‘ benefits would need to consider the broad range of benefits, preferences and 
perquisites available to veterans but not part of workers‘ compensation systems.  See supra 
Part I.B.1 (identifying the origins and scope of the military‘s uniform compensation 
system).  These include ―educational benefits, extensive health benefits, home-buying loan 
benefits, and retirement benefits.‖  Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 n.10 (1987).  
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that service members could recover under the FTCA it would have given 
direction about how moneys received from the two remedies would be 
adjusted.488 
Justice Scalia argues that ―the [Veterans Benefits Act] is not, as Feres 
assumed, identical to federal and state workers‘ compensation statutes‖ 
because they almost invariably contain ―exclusivity provisions‖ which the 
veterans statutes do not.489  But the Court held in United States v. Demko490 
that the Prison Industries Fund was the exclusive remedy for federal 
prisoners injured while working for Federal Prison Industries, Inc., even 
though that statute does not contain exclusivity language.491  The statute 
was enacted in 1934 and its legislative history does not address the 
exclusivity issue.492  The Court recognized that ―compensation laws are 
practically always thought of as substitutes for, not supplements to, 
common-law tort actions.‖493  It distinguished its Muniz decision because 
unlike the prisoner plaintiffs there, plaintiff Demko was ―injured . . . in the 
performance of an assigned prison task‖ and ―is protected by the prison 
compensation law.‖494  Accordingly, that law was his exclusive remedy, 
precluding his FTCA suit.495 
Justice Scalia also argues that ―both before and after Feres we permitted 
injured servicemen to bring FTCA suits, even though they had been 
compensated under the [Veterans Benefit Act].‖496  He pointedly observes 
that ―the [Veterans Benefit Act] will in fact be exclusive for service-
connected injuries, but not for others,‖ and suggests that the tension cannot 
be resolved from the texts of the statutes.497  This tension was recognized 
                                                      
 488. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.  Jayson & Longstreth note: 
Since the turn of the century, most tort remedies against employers for work-
related injuries have been eliminated, with an administrative compensation scheme 
substituted in their place. . . . It would certainly be strange to conclude that 
Congress intended that servicemen, virtually alone among American workers, be 
given free rein to sue their employer.   
JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 5A.05. 
 489. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 698 (Scalia, J., dissenting).   
 490. 385 U.S. 149 (1966). 
 491. Id. at 151–52.  Federal Prison Industries, Inc. is the federal corporation  
that provides training and rehabilitation programs for prisoners.  18 U.S.C. § 4126 (2006).   
 492. Denko, 385 U.S. at 152.   
 493. Id. at 151.   
 494. Id. at 149, 153.   
 495. Id. at 154.   
 496. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 697–98 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 111 (1954); Brooks v. United States,  
337 U.S. 49, 53 (1949)). 
 497. Id. at 698.   
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by the judges that dealt with the Feres litigation.498  It hardly shows that 
Feres is wrong.   
Nowhere in his dissent does Justice Scalia directly address or 
acknowledge the Feres Court‘s core analysis on the compensation issue.  
The absence from the FTCA of any ―statutory authority‖ one way or 
another directing how tort judgments and money paid administratively are 
to be reconciled suggests that Congress was not ―aware[] that the Act might 
be interpreted to permit recovery for injuries incident to military 
service.‖499   
Some of the confusion surrounding the compensation issue is attributable 
to the Court.  Over time, the Court has been imprecise in describing Feres‘ 
analysis of the compensation issue.  The Feres reasoning about the ―simple, 
certain, and uniform‖ military compensation system500 is that, had 
Congress contemplated that the FTCA would apply to incident-to-service 
claims, ―it is difficult to see why it should have omitted any provision to 
adjust these two types of remedy to each other.‖501  In Stencel Aero 
Engineering Corp., this ―adjustment‖ point was lost; the Court stated only 
that ―the Veterans‘ Benefits Act establishes, as a substitute for tort liability, 
a statutory ‗no fault‘ compensation scheme which provides generous 
pensions to injured servicemen, without regard to any negligence 
attributable to the Government.‖502  In Shearer, the point was reduced to a 
footnote:  ―Although no longer controlling, other factors mentioned in 
Feres are present here. . . .  [T]he record shows that Private Shearer‘s 
dependents are entitled to statutory veterans‘ benefits.‖503  In Johnson the 
point was accurately presented again: 
 The Court in Feres found it difficult to believe that Congress would 
have provided such a comprehensive system of benefits while at the 
same time contemplating recovery for service-related injuries under the 
                                                      
 498. See infra Part IV.B.3.c. 
 499. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144 (1950).  Justice Scalia‘s Johnson dissent 
has received its own criticism: 
The dissent‘s case against Feres fails because it does not directly address the plain 
meaning of Sections 1346(b) and 2674; does not address Justice Jackson‘s 
syllogistic inquiry into the Congressional intent behind the FTCA; relies nearly 
exclusively on post-Feres case law to undermine a statutory interpretation premised 
on the statute‘s text and legislative history; turns on an ill-considered proclamation 
about the legal mores of 1946; and too casually repudiates almost forty years of 
Congressional tolerance and expansion of the Feres doctrine.   
Bernott, supra note 487, at 135. 
 500. Feres, 340 U.S. at 144.   
 501. Id.   
 502. Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 671 (1977).   
 503. United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 58 n.4 (1985) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 144–
45).   
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FTCA.  Particularly persuasive was the fact that Congress ―omitted any 
provision to adjust these two types of remedy to each other.‖
504
   
2. Other Challenges to the Feres Conclusion 
a. Language in Earlier Tort Claims Bills 
When it laid out the ―considerations persuasive of liability,‖505 the Feres 
Court noted that ―eighteen tort claims bills were introduced in Congress 
between 1925 and 1935 and all but two expressly denied recovery to 
members of the armed forces; but the bill enacted as the present Tort 
Claims Act from its introduction made no exception.‖506  Many critics have 
argued that this piece of information undermines Feres‘ holding:  ―The 
omission of such a bar, when one was considered and rejected in sixteen 
previous tort bills, clearly indicates that Congress did not intend to limit 
service members‘ ability to sue under the Federal Tort Claims Act.‖507 
There are three problems with this argument.  First, it ignores the 
substantial time gap between when the cited bills were considered—the last 
was in 1935—and passage of the FTCA more than a decade later.508  The 
cited bills are not contemporaneous with the FTCA‘s enactment and, 
therefore, are suspect as a reflection of Congressional intent in 1946.509   
                                                      
 504. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690 (1987) (quoting Feres, 340 U.S. at 
144).   
 505. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138. 
 506. Id. at 139 (citing Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 51 (1949)).  The Court‘s 
comment that ―the bill enacted . . . made no exception‖ refers to S. 2177, 79th Cong. tit. IV 
(1946). 
 507. Brou, supra note 447, at 37; see, e.g., Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 870 n. 
1(9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (citing Feres, 340 U.S. at 138–39, and asserting 
―that all but two of the eighteen drafts of the FTCA considered by Congress barred suits by 
members of the military‖); Turley, supra note 9, at 16 n.105 (stating that ―sixteen of the 
eighteen drafts of the FTCA contained a prohibition on suits by service members, a position 
rejected in the final legislation.‖).   
 508. Brou states that ―[b]etween 1942 and the passage of the [FTCA] in 1946, Congress 
considered eighteen tort claims bills.‖  Brou, supra note 447, at 37.  But the eighteen bills 
cited in her supporting footnote are the same ones cited in Brooks and are dated from 1925 
to 1935.  Compare id. at 37 n.261, with Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51 n.2.   
 509. See CHRISTIAN E. MAMMEN, USING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN AMERICAN STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 27, 67 (2002) (acknowledging the usefulness of legislative history in 
clarifying ambiguous statutory issues, but qualifying this acknowledgment by stating that 
only contemporaneous legislative history should be used in the aid of statutory interpretation 
because pre-enactment legislative history is suspect); see also id. at  
66–67, (citing Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 497 n.3 (1992) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)) (supporting a general proposition that pre-enactment legislative 
history is suspect).  In Cowart, Justice Blackmun questioned the use of legislative history 
from predecessor bills considered three years prior to the enactment of the Longshore and 
Harbor Workers‘ Compensation Act Amendments of 1984.  505 U.S. at 497 n.3 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting).   
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Second, the bills were very different from the FTCA as it was finally 
enacted.  Six of them provided only administrative remedies for personal 
injury or wrongful death claims, with no recourse to the courts.510  Eight 
called for administrative proceedings before the General Accounting Office 
or an Employees Compensation Commission, coupled with a right to 
review in the Court of Claims.511  Fourteen of them had different 
procedures for property claims than for claims involving personal injury or 
death.512  Fourteen placed caps on the amount of damages that might be 
recovered.513  
Only three of the eighteen bills granted subject matter jurisdiction to 
United States district courts, and they bear very little resemblance to the 
FTCA as it was enacted.514  They are much shorter than the FTCA, having 
lengths of 100 lines,515 fifty lines,516 and fifty-one lines,517 compared to the 
FTCA‘s 307 lines.518  None of the three contained a detailed jurisdictional 
grant comparable to 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).519  None contained any of the 
exceptions included in § 2680 of the FTCA,520 although two included 
provisions that would bar claims by service members.521  Because the 
                                                      
 510. See H.R. 15428, 71st Cong. § 1(a) (1930); S. 4377, 71st Cong. §§ 201–209 (1930); 
H.R. 9285, 70th Cong. §§ 201–209 (1928); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong. §§ 201–213 (1926); S. 
1912, 69th Cong. §§ 2, 3 (1926); H.R. 12178, 68th Cong. § 2 (1925). 
 511. See S. 1043, 74th Cong. § 304 (1935); H.R. 129, 73d Cong. §§ 11–12, 14–15 
(1933); S. 1833, 73d Cong. § 304 (1933) (providing that any insurance available to claimant 
be deducted from the damages to be paid by government); S. 4567, 72d Cong. § 304 (1932) 
(same); S. 211, 72d Cong. § 303 (1931); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. § 303 (1931); H.R. 17168, 
71st Cong. §§ 303, 307 (1931) (―[T]he findings of the Comptroller General shall be prima 
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.‖); H.R. 16429, 71st Cong. §§ 33, 37 (1931) 
(same). 
 512. See S. 1043 (providing different procedures and limitations for property damage 
claims than those for personal injury claims)); S. 1833, 73d Cong. (1933) (same); S. 4567 
(same); S. 211, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. (1931) (same); H.R. 5065, 72d Cong. (1931) (same); 
H.R. 17168 (1931) (same); H.R. 16429 (same); H.R. 15428 (conferring authority upon the 
Court of Claims to review on certiorari any settlements made under the provisions of the 
title, but limited the record on review to  
―a transcript of all the papers filed . . . prior to [the] settlement, together with . . . the 
decision of the Comptroller General‖); S. 4377 (same) ; H.R. 9285 (same); H.R. 6716 
(same); S. 1912 (providing no provision for personal injury or death); H.R. 12179, 68th 
Cong. (1925) (providing no provision for property damage); H.R. 12178 (providing no 
provision for property damage). 
 513. See supra notes 438–40 and accompanying text (discussing the use of damage caps 
in pre-FTCA bills). 
 514. See H.R. 8561, 73d Cong. § 2 (1934) (requiring pre-suit certificate of probable 
cause from the district judge); H.R. 8914, 69th Cong. (1926); H.R. 12179. 
 515. H.R. 8561. 
 516. H.R. 8914. 
 517. H.R. 12179. 
 518. S. 2177, 79th Cong. (1946) 62–71. 
 519. H.R. 8561; H.R. 8914; H.R. 12179. 
 520. See id. 
 521. H.R. 8914 § 6; H.R. 12179 § 6. 
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eighteen cited bills are so different from the FTCA, the absence of some of 
their provisions from its final version does not demonstrate Congressional 
intent.522 
The third reason to reject the inference of Congressional intent from the 
absence of an explicit FTCA exception for service members is that such an 
exception was unnecessary in the first place.  Judge Augustus Hand 
explained three key points in the Second Circuit‘s Feres opinion:  (1) 
service members could not recover for injuries incurred incident-to-service 
under the Military Personnel Claims Act;523 (2) law established by Dobson 
and Bradey before enactment of the FTCA barred suit for such injuries;524 
and (3) the World War Veterans‘ Act of 1924 had been amended to state 
that when it provided compensation, ―‗no other pension laws or laws 
providing for gratuities or payments in the event of death in the service‘ 
shall be applicable to disabilities or deaths made compensable under the 
Act.‖525  Accordingly, ―the explanation for the omission of the thirteenth 
exception to the Tort Claims Act is that it was considered unnecessary.‖526   
Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit was apparently persuaded by 
Judge Hand‘s analysis.  In his dissent from the Fourth Circuit‘s Brooks 
decision, Judge Parker noted that the proposed exception in H.R. 181 
would have barred, ―‗[a]ny claim for which compensation is provided by 
the Federal Employees‘ Compensation Act, as amended, or by the World 
War Veterans‘ Act of 1924, as amended.‘‖527   
He argued that ―[w]hat seems a conclusive reason for not reading into the 
act the exception suggested, however, is that this exception was originally 
contained in the tort claims act which was introduced into Congress . . . and 
was omitted, with apparent deliberation, when that bill was 
incorporated . . . [into] the Legislative Reorganization Act.‖528  A year later, 
sitting on the Fourth Circuit‘s unanimous Jefferson panel, Judge Parker 
declined to make that argument.529  Rather, the Fourth Circuit stated that it 
                                                      
 522. See U.S. Brooks Br., supra note 60, at 35–36 (proposing alternative interpretations 
of the Congressional intent underlying the passage of the FTCA); MAMMEN, supra note 509, 
at 67 (qualifying the usefulness of pre-enactment legislative history when interpreting 
ambiguous statutory issues). 
 523. Feres v. United States, 177 F.2d 535, 537 (2d Cir. 1949) (citing 31  
U.S.C. § 223b (1946)). 
 524. Id. (citing Bradey v. United States, 151 F.2d 742 (2d Cir. 1945); Dobson v. United 
States, 27 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1928)). 
 525. Id. at 537–38 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 422 (1946)).   
 526. Id. at 538.   
 527. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 849 (4th Cir. 1948) (Parker, C.J., dissenting) 
(citing H.R. 181, 79th Cong. § 402(8) (1946)), rev’d, 337 U.S. 49 (1949). 
 528. Id.   
 529. Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres 
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (―[T]oo much weight should not be given to the 
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was ―in accord with the conclusions reached by the Second Circuit.‖530  Its 
opinion concluded that Congress had not intended for the FTCA to allow 
every injury to a service member to become a potential negligence action 
because that would require the courts to review military decisions and 
would undermine military discipline.531  The court reasoned that ―this 
consideration [was] too weighty to be swept aside by‖ the argument that 
Congress must have intended to allow such suits when it had not included a 
proposed exception for military claims in the final version of the FTCA.532  
Judge Chesnut followed a similar path in the Jefferson district court 
litigation, acknowledging the potential strength of the missing exception 
argument in his first opinion,533 but holding against it in the second.534   
b. Feres & the Deterrence Role of Tort Law 
Feres is attacked on the ground that its bar to suit by service members 
for government negligence has removed the deterrence role that tort law 
normally serves.  Professor Turley argues largely from the perspective of 
financial deterrence535 while Major Brou argues for the deterrence of 
disclosure.536  
i. Financial Deterrence 
Professor Turley argues that the Feres bar immunizes the military from 
the financial costs of our tort system that normally encourage safe 
practices.  He states: 
 Feres constitutes a major reduction in potential costs for military 
businesses and activities.  For most businesses, liability costs (including 
insurance, risk abatement, and actual liability awards) represent a 
significant budget component. . . . Moreover, potential liability costs are 
a critical factor in businesses determining whether to enter a particular 
market or enterprise. For the military, such costs are present in a greatly 
reduced form.
537
 
                                                      
language contained in discarded measures . . . .‖).   
 530. Id. at 519.   
 531. Id. at 520.   
 532. Id. 
 533. Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. 209, 211 (D. Md. 1947).   
 534. Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 712 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 1949), 
aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).   
 535. See Turley, supra note 9, at 46–47 (relying upon the paradigm of the rational, self-
interested, value-maximizing actor).   
 536. See Brou, supra note 447, at 33 (noting the increased judicial and public attention 
that FTCA claims impose on government organizations). 
 537. Turley, supra note 9, at 49–50.  Professor Turley develops his Feres-Deterrence-
argument at length.  Id. at 46–67.  Accordingly, this summary of his argument is necessarily 
truncated. 
PAUL FIGLEY 60.2 
460 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:393 
 
 . . . . 
  With commonly tight budgetary conditions in the military, 
asymmetrical increases in the cost of individual units or programs will 
also be generally tracked. Even if such costs are borne in part by the 
Justice Department as the designated defense counsel for such claims, 
these costs will become part of an appropriation request and therefore 
subject to an oversight review in Congress. . . .  This could introduce 
personal costs for physicians in the form of increased insurance rates.
538
 
 . . . . 
 By introducing a liability system, the military will be forced to 
internalize more of the true costs of [its negligence].
539
 
 The argument that Feres undermines the financial deterrence role of tort 
law fails for two reasons.  First, as a general matter there is reason to 
believe that governments are not responsive to financial deterrence in the 
same way as private entities.  Second, federal agencies such as the 
Department of Defense are not responsive to financial deterrence because 
they have virtually no stake in the financial outcome of tort claims brought 
against the United States for their negligent acts. 
Professor Turley reasons that ―there is little question that increasing 
levels of liability will influence the conduct of a rational actor.‖540  There 
is, however, substantial question about how governments will respond to 
increased tort liability because governments and their agencies are not 
motivated by the single interest of maximizing monetary value.541  Because 
governments and agencies respond to political interests rather than 
financial ones, it is unlikely that requiring them to pay tort judgments will 
cause them to alter their practices or begin new loss prevention 
initiatives.542  This is particularly so if agencies perceive that compensation 
payments will not affect their budgets, either because payments are made 
from a general fund or because they expect that money paid from budgets 
                                                      
 538. Id. at 66.   
 539. Id. at 67.   
 540. Id. at 47.   
 541. See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay:  Markets, Politics, and the 
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 355–56 (2000) (concluding that 
one cannot simply assume ―that government will behave like a private, profit-maximizing 
firm‖).   
 542. See Turley, supra note 9, at 48 (―[P]ast cases indicate high rates of malpractice and 
injuries have occurred within this [military] system without meaningful risk-avoidance . . . 
.‖);  Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 915, 965 (2005) (―Government officials do not derive any intrinsic value from public 
funds . . . and therefore do not necessarily attach any disutility to losing it through 
compensation payments.‖); Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages 
Liability:  Torts, Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 824–26 
(2007) (summarizing the gradual erosion of the assumption that government tort liability 
works in the same manner as the common law liability of private tortfeasors).   
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will be restored in future appropriations.543  Agencies will also weigh the 
political cost of choosing loss prevention programs and enhanced safety 
over core agency functions and more politically-valued programs.544  
Because agencies engage in such political balancing, ―tort liability cannot 
be expected to promote efficient government investment in loss 
prevention.‖545  When tort damages are paid out as a consequence of such 
choices, the agency can rationalize the payment as ―a cost of public 
policy.‖546  Accordingly, agencies are not responsive to financial 
deterrence. 
Financial deterrence is even less effective with federal agencies such as 
the Department of Defense.  Federal agencies in general are subject to the 
political issues discussed in the preceding paragraph.  Because military 
officers will not expect to be in the same position three years hence, their 
political choices regarding the programs they direct may be even more 
skewed to favor core agency functions.547   
Federal agencies have very little stake in the financial outcome of tort 
litigation that arises from their negligence.548  Agencies do not pay FTCA 
settlements in excess of $2,500 or FTCA judgments.549  Those settlements 
and judgments are paid from the Judgment Fund rather than agency 
                                                      
 543. Accord Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case 
of the Missing Tort Claims, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 758 (2004) (examining similar incentive 
structures within the context of police departments); see Levinson, supra note 542, at 966 
(acknowledging that legislators who approve of an agency‘s activities may simply replace 
any losses imposed by liability in the following appropriations cycle).  
 544. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 826 (―When the political cost of diverting public 
resources to loss prevention is sufficiently high, government will not make the investment 
even when it is economically justified.‖).   
 545. Id.  For example, a social welfare agency must choose between providing more 
benefits directly to clients and maintaining its physical facilities and staff credentials.   
 546. See Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 
1529, 1539 (1992). 
 547. See generally 10 U.S.C. § 664 (2008) (stipulating the length of duty assignments); 
DEP‘T OF DEF., INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1300.19, DOD JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT 
PROGRAM 3 (2010) (evidencing DOD policy that tour lengths not exceed three years per 
tour).    
 548. See Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra note 477, at 15 (―[T]he FTCA message to 
correct negligent behavior is somewhat muted since the FTCA holds the Government, not 
the individual, liable‖).  But see id. (acknowledging that federal agencies do bear the cost of 
providing litigation support, witnesses, and in-house counsel to assist the Department of 
Justice attorneys that represent the government in court).   
 549. 28 U.S.C. § 2672 (2006); 3 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. 
COUNSEL, GAO-08-078SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14–30 to –44 (3d 
ed. 2008) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES, 3d. ed.], available at  
http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d08978sp.pdf.  The rare exceptions include 
nonappropriated fund instrumentalities, id. at 15–266, and the U.S. Postal Service, 3 U.S. 
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, GAO/OGC-94-33, PRINCIPLES OF 
FEDERAL APPROPRIATIONS LAW 14–34 to –37 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES, 2d. ed.], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/og94033.pdf.  
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appropriations.550  Because the Judgment Fund is a permanent, indefinite 
appropriation,551 any FTCA judgment or settlement is paid automatically 
and without any Congressional oversight review.552  Because the FTCA 
grants immunity to federal employees for any tort cognizable under the 
Act,553 those employees do not suffer financial consequences for their 
negligence nor do they need liability insurance.554  For all these reasons, if 
Feres did not exist, the Department of Defense would be no more 
responsive to financial deterrence than it is with Feres. 
ii. Deterrence of Disclosure 
Major Brou argues that the Feres Court, in focusing on the compensation 
aspect of the benefits provided to injured service members, ignored the 
preventative function provided by tort law.  In arguing that FTCA claims 
have the potential to hone judicial and public attention on the shortcomings 
of governmental organizations, Major Brou maintains that the Feres 
doctrine undermines the government‘s incentive to improve efficiency and 
safety by allowing it to avoid liability for injuries inflicted upon service 
members by government negligence.555 
This argument ignores the non-tort factors that already bring about 
disclosure, overestimates the likely effect of disclosures that might arise 
from tort litigation, and disregards the current exposure of military agencies 
to tort litigation arising from care provided to civilians.  There are more 
effective ways to bring about broad public disclosure than tort litigation, 
including a vigorous political system and a free press.
556
  Most tort cases 
(as opposed to their underlying events) do not lead to widespread media 
                                                      
 550. See 31 U.S.C. §1304 (2006); PRINCIPLES, 3d. ed., supra note 549, at 14–19 to  
–49. 
 551. See H.R. REP NO. 84-2638, at 72 (1957) (noting that H.R. 12138, 84th Cong.  
§ 1302 ―establish[es] a permanent indefinite appropriation for the payment of judgments‖).   
 552. PRINCIPLES, 2d. ed., supra note 549, at 14-5 to -15; JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra 
note 35, § 3.03. 
 553. See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006). 
 554. Government health care professionals stand in a different posture because, although 
they are immune from paying damages, adverse judgments arising from their care are 
reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank. See 42 U.S.C.  
§§ 11131–37 (2006).  See generally Hornbrook & Kirschbaum supra note 477, at 15 n.104. 
 555. Brou, supra note 449, at 33; see also Turley, supra note 9, at 47–49 (discussing 
non-liability mechanisms that can influence agency risk prevention). 
 556. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 828–29 (rejecting the suggestion that tort 
litigation will ―unearth[] governmental misconduct‖); Turley, supra note 9, at 47 (noting 
good faith military response to political pressure about medical malpractice).  But see 
Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making Government Pay:  The Deterrent Effect of 
Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845, 859–62 (2001) (exploring the 
informational and fault-fixing features of municipal liability suits).  
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coverage.557  To the extent that tort litigation has a deterrence of disclosure, 
the military medical system is already fruitful ground for its work because 
a majority of its patients are not service members to whom Feres applies.558  
Therefore, doing away with Feres would bring about only an incremental 
increase in the deterrence of disclosure. 
3. Characterizations of Feres 
a. Feres as “Judicially Created” 
In Feres, the Court explained:  ―We do not think that Congress, in 
drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local law for 
service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.‖559  Thus, on its face, 
Feres is the Supreme Court‘s interpretation of Congressional intent, rather 
than a judicial promulgation of a new exception to the FTCA.  Over the last 
three decades, this point has been clouded by a number of circuit court 
opinions that casually characterize the Feres doctrine as a ―judicially 
created exception‖ to the FTCA.560  The opinions support this 
characterization by reference to the statute,561 to Feres itself,562 or to 
nothing at all.563   
The notion that Feres is a ―judicially created FTCA exception‖ was 
mentioned in only one judicial opinion in the first twenty-three years after 
the decision.564  From 1973 to 1977, just three opinions used the ―judicially 
                                                      
 557. See Rosenthal, supra note 542, at 828–29. 
 558. See U.S. DEP‘T OF DEF., EVALUATION OF THE TRICARE PROGRAM:  FISCAL YEAR 
2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS 17 (2010) (reporting that Active Duty military personnel 
constituted fourteen percent of beneficiaries eligible for DoD health care benefits at the end 
of fiscal year 2009, and Guard and Reserve military personnel constituted four percent; the 
remaining eighty-two percent are active duty family members, guard and reserve family 
members, and retirees and family members). 
 559. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
 560. See, e.g., McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1341 (11th Cir. 
2007); Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 611 (6th Cir. 2006) (―[The FTCA is] subject 
to a judicially-created exception carved out in Feres v. United States . . . .‖); Pringle v. 
United States, 208 F.3d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Miller v. United States, 
42 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995); Romero ex rel. Romero v. United States, 954 F.2d 223, 
224 (4th Cir. 1992); Chatman v. Hernandez, 805 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); 
Brown v. United States, 739 F.2d 362, 364–65 (8th Cir. 1984); see also Hata v. United 
States, 23 F.3d 230, 234 (9th Cir. 1994) (describing the Feres doctrine as a ―judicially 
created ‗incident to service‘ exception to the [FTCA]‖). 
 561. Hata, 23 F.3d at 234 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994)). 
 562. McMahon, 502 F.3d at 1341; Brown, 462 F.3d at 611; Pringle, 208 F.3d at 1223; 
Romero, 954 F.2d at 224; Chatman, 805 F.2d at 457; cf. Brown, 739 F.2d at 365 (citing 
United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110 (1954); Feres, 340 U.S. 135; Brooks v. United States, 
337 U.S. 49 (1949)). 
 563. Miller, 42 F.3d at 300. 
 564. Mattos v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 38, 38 (E.D. Cal. 1967) (addressing the 
contention that ―no recovery may be had as against the United States because of judicially-
created exception to the [FTCA] . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
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created‖ characterization, but none provided authority or explanation for 
the term.565  In a similar fashion, and with a similar lack of authority or 
explanation, Justice Marshall used the phrase in his 1977 Stencel dissent, 
stating, ―I cannot agree that that narrow, judicially created exception to the 
waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Act should be extended to 
any category of litigation other than suits against the Government by 
active-duty servicemen based on injuries incurred while on duty.‖566 
 Legal scholarship was similarly silent.  Only one academic article 
published in the 1950s suggested that Feres judicially created a new 
exception to the FTCA.567  In the 1960s, only one student article made such 
a characterization.568  In the 1980s, it appeared in several student works569 
and a handful of works by scholars.570  As in the judicial opinions, the 
characterization was either baldly stated or supported only by a reference to 
the FTCA or the Feres opinion.571  
By the 1990s, the notion that the Feres decision had ―judicially created‖ 
a new exception to the FTCA had become a shibboleth, widely repeated, 
                                                      
 565. Hass ex rel. United States v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1143 (4th Cir. 1975) 
(citing only Feres); Bankston v. United States, 480 F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1973) (same); 
Frazier v. United States, 372 F. Supp. 208, 208–09 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (same). 
 566. Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 674 (1977) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 567. See Robert A. Hitch, The Federal Tort Claims Act and Military Personnel, 8 
RUTGERS L. REV. 316, 316 (1954) (―In Feres . . . [t]he Court in effect added an exception to 
the act which discriminated against certain servicemen.‖). 
 568. Recent Development, Negligently Conducted Pre-Induction Physical Examination 
Not Actionable Under Federal Tort Claims Act when Injury Occurs During Service, 62 
COLUM. L. REV. 381, 381–82 (1962) (characterizing the Feres doctrine as an exception 
―created by judicial decision‖). 
 569. See, e.g., John Astley, Note, United States v. Johnson:  Feres Doctrine Gets New 
Life and Continues to Grow, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 185, 185 (1988) (―The source of the 
injustice is the Feres doctrine, the only judicially-created exception to the [FTCA].‖ (citing 
Federal Tort Claims Act, Pub. L. No. 79-601, §§ 401–22, 60 Stat. 842 (1946); Feres v. 
United States 340 U.S. 135 (1950))); Brian P. Cain, Note, Military Medical Malpractice and 
the Feres Doctrine, 20 GA. L. REV. 497, 498 (1986); J. Thomas Morina, Note, Denial of 
Atomic Veterans’ Tort Claims:  The Enduring Fallout from Feres v. United States, 24 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 259, 260 (1983); Lora Tredway, Comment, When a Veteran “Wants” 
Uncle Sam:  Theories of Recovery for Servicemembers Exposed to Hazardous Substances, 
31 AM. U. L. REV. 1095, 1112 (1982). 
 570. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1007, 1086 n.337 (1989) (explaining that the Supreme Court used a broad 
application of a ―judicially created exception to FTCA‖); Courtney W. Howland, The 
Hands-Off Policy and Intramilitary Torts, 71 IOWA L. REV. 93, 102 (1985); Harold Hongju 
Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs:  Lessons of the Iran-
Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1336 n.377 (1988); Paul Wolfson, Preemption and 
Federalism:  The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 105 n.198 (1988) (describing 
the ―judicially created Feres doctrine‖ as peculiar); see also Jeffrey R. Simmons, Military 
Medical Malpractice, 23 ARIZ. B.J. 22, 24 (1988) (explaining that the Court ―judicially 
created an exception in . . . Feres‖). 
 571. See supra notes 569–70. 
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generally accepted, and largely unexamined.572  The falsity of that notion is 
suggested by the fact that it was barely murmured in the two decades 
immediately following the decision.  The falsity is demonstrated by an 
examination of how the Feres Court came to its decision.573 
b. Feres as “Usurpation” 
Some of the most distinguished critics of the Feres opinion go further 
than repeating the vaguely judgmental, ―judicially created‖ allegation.  
They accuse the Court of intentionally usurping the role of Congress.  
Professor Turley argues: 
[T]he actions of the Court in creating the Feres doctrine go far beyond 
other areas in usurping legislative prerogatives.  The Court essentially 
created a civil liability system to its own liking, based on its own 
uninformed assumptions.  The Court‘s unilateral action not only conflicts 
with the language of the FTCA but engages in a level of judicial 
legislation that may be unprecedented in its scope and impact.  At a 
minimum, Feres represented a total departure from principles of judicial 
restraint and deference to the political branches.
574
 
This is a very strong accusation. 
The Feres opinion explicitly states that the Court‘s goal was to figure 
out, as best it could, what Congress had intended when it passed the 
FTCA.575  The task was difficult because nothing in the FTCA‘s legislative 
                                                      
 572. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441, 444 (1999) (―[T]he judiciary has created an additional, major 
exception . . . known as the Feres doctrine.‖); Hornbrook & Kirschbaum, supra note 477, at 
18 (1990); see also Norman W. Black, Recent Developments in Admiralty Law in the United 
States Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit, and the Eleventh Circuit, 19 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 327, 
353 (1997) (citing Miller v. United States, 42 F.3d 297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995)); Koh, supra 
note 570, at 1336 n.377 (citing United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 694 (1987) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting)); Peggy L. Miller, An Ounce of Immunity Prevents a Pound of Lawsuits:  
Medical Malpractice and Military Mothers, 70 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 327, 332 (1993) 
(citing Feres, 340 U.S. 135); Sisk, supra note 444, at 287; Wolfson, supra note 570, at 105 
n.198 (citing Johnson, 481 U.S. at 694–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Feres, 340 U.S. at 143–
44). 
 573. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 574. Turley, supra note 9, at 68 (citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 
(1976) (per curiam); Costo v. United States, 248 F.3d 863, 870 (9th Cir. 2001) (Ferguson, J., 
dissenting)) (emphasis added).  Judge Ferguson stated:   
When considering the Feres doctrine, however, we are not dealing with a 
legislative action, but rather with a judicial re-writing of an unambiguous and 
constitutional statute. . . .  Feres presented neither ambiguity nor constitutional 
violation nor legislative silence. . . . [T]he Court simply did not agree with 
Congress and searched in puzzling ways to declare that military personnel are not 
equal to civilians.  
Costo, 248 F.3d at 871, 873. 
 575. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 138 (―The only issue of law raised is whether the Tort 
Claims Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what under other 
circumstances would be an actionable wrong.‖); id. (―Under these circumstances [the 
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history addressed the question whether the Act encompassed claims arising 
from military service.576  The usurpation theory requires disbelief of the 
Court‘s statements that it was engaged in good faith legislative 
interpretation.  But there is no basis for concluding that the Court was 
disingenuous. 
The Feres decision does not conflict with the language of the FTCA.  
The argument that it does conflict is based on the assertion that the 
combatant activity exception of § 2680(j) is the only provision that limits 
service members‘ rights under the FTCA.577  While the exceptions set out 
in § 2680 are important limitations on the FTCA‘s waiver of sovereign 
immunity, the jurisdictional limits of § 1346(b) are an equally important 
part of the law and must also be met.578  Accordingly, the combatant 
activity exception of § 2680(j) is not the only FTCA provision that might 
bar claims of service members.579   
The usurpation theory is baseless.  There is simply no evidence that nine 
justices chose to ―create[] a civil liability system to [their] own liking‖580 
                                                      
absence of any legislative history], no conclusion can be above challenge, but if we 
misinterpret the Act, at least Congress possesses a ready remedy.‖); id. at 146 (―We do not 
think that Congress, in drafting this Act, created a new cause of action dependent on local 
law for service-connected injuries or death due to negligence.‖).  
 576. Id. at 138 (―No committee reports or floor debates disclose what effect the statute 
was designed to have on the problem before us, or that it even was in mind.‖). 
 577. See, e.g., Turley, supra note 9, at 8 (asserting that Congress only expressly 
exempted FTCA claims that arose out of ―combatant activities of the military . . . [in a] time 
of war,‖ noting that the ―choice of wording by Congress is telling‖); see also Costo, 248 
F.3d at 871–73 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  Judge Ferguson argued: 
Feres took [the combatant activity exception, § 2680(j),] a fairly small, clearly 
defined, legislatively-created classification and broadened it considerably. . . .  We 
can speculate forever upon reasons why Feres refused to apply a law written by 
Congress.  It is clear that Feres recognized that the direct and unambiguous 
command of Congress created liability for claims caused by members of the 
military or naval forces of the United States, Feres, 340 U.S. at 138; 28 U.S.C. § 
2671, and that the direct and unambiguous command of Congress exempted only 
claims arising out of combatant activities during time of war, Feres, 340 U.S. at 
138; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j).   
Costo, 248 F.3d at 872–73 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).  This is mistaken on both accounts.  
The Court did not derive Feres from the combatant activity exception.  The Feres opinion 
mentions the exception only once, and only in the context of discussing several rejected 
―considerations persuasive of liability.‖  340 U.S. at 138.  Nor did the Court recognize that 
the exception created a ―direct and unambiguous command.‖  To the contrary, the Court 
considered this argument and rejected it.  See id. (identifying the argument that ―from [the 
combatant activity exception] it is said we should infer allowance of claims arising from 
non-combat activities in peace‖). 
 578. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) (explaining that Section 1346(b) 
grants jurisdiction for certain claims against the United States, and noting that each element 
of the jurisdictional grant must be met; supra notes 459–63 and accompanying text). 
 579. See Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477 (rejecting an FTCA claim on the grounds that it failed 
to present a cognizable claim to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement).   
 580. See Turley, supra note 9, at 68. 
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and disregarded a ―direct and unambiguous command‖581 of Congress.  The 
historical backdrop to Feres fully supports the Court‘s conclusion that 
Congress did not contemplate that the FTCA would allow incident-to-
service suits by service members.  This background includes the long 
legislative build-up to the enactment of the FTCA, the detailed, 
compensation system Congress created for service members, coupled with 
the lack of Congressional direction about how that compensation would be 
reconciled with FTCA judgments, the significant pre-FTCA body of law 
barring suits related to military service, and the absence of private laws 
enacted for service members. 
The strongest reason to reject the usurpation theory is the evident good 
faith of the justices who dealt with the incident-to-service issue.  Feres was 
decided without dissent.582  Of those nine justices, five had voted in favor 
of the Brooks holding that service members could sue under the FTCA for 
injuries not incident-to-service.583  The fact that a majority of the justices 
voted against the government in Brooks and for the government in Feres is 
strong confirmation that they were forthright in their approach to 
ascertaining what Congress had intended, as opposed to pushing some pro-
military agenda. 
Chief Judge Parker of the Fourth Circuit followed a similar path.  Judge 
Parker had dissented from the Fourth Circuit opinion in Brooks, which held 
that the FTCA did not allow any suits by service members.584  His dissent 
foreshadowed the Supreme Court‘s Brooks opinion, which reversed the 
Fourth Circuit and held that suits could be brought for injuries to service 
members that were not incident to military service.585  Judge Parker was 
also on the unanimous Fourth Circuit panel in Jefferson that held the FTCA 
did not authorize claims for injuries that arose incident-to-service because 
―it [was] not reasonable to suppose, in the absence of an express 
declaration on the point, that Congress intended‖ to allow such claims.586  
U.S. District Judge William Chesnut showed similar care and intellectual 
honesty.  When first confronted with the incident-to-service issue in 
                                                      
 581. Costo, 248 F.3d at 873 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).   
 582. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 135. 
 583. See Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 53–54 (1949).  Justices Frankfurter and 
Douglas dissented.  Id.  Justice Clark joined the Court on August 19, 1949.  Justice Minton 
joined on October 12, 1949. 
 584. United States v. Brooks, 169 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir. 1948) (Parker, J., dissenting), 
rev’d 337 U.S. 49 (1949).   
 585. The Supreme Court stated in its Brooks opinion, ―We agree with Judge Parker.‖  
Brooks, 337 U.S. at 51.  It then adopted much of his analysis.  Compare Brooks, 337 U.S. at 
51–54, with Brooks, 169 F.2d at 846–50. 
 586. See Jefferson v. United States, 178 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1949), aff’d sub nom. 
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
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Jefferson, he denied the government‘s motion to dismiss without 
prejudice.587  Following a trial on the merits, he re-examined the motion 
and granted it, concluding that such claims ―were not within the 
contemplation of Congress in enacting this particular legislation.‖588   
The usurpation theory is refuted by the language of Justice Jackson‘s 
opinion, the lack of evidence that the Court was disingenuous in stating its 
legislative interpretation goal, and the justices‘ demonstrated willingness to 
reject the government‘s strong arguments and find liability in Brooks.  It is 
also contradicted by the richness of thought and due care of the judges who 
dealt with the incident-to-service issue in the courts below.  A careful 
reading of the decisions in Brooks, Jefferson, Griggs, and Feres, and the 
Supreme Court briefs in those cases, negates any suggestion that the Court 
sought to ignore Congress and impose its own will.   
c. Feres as “Unfair” 
The Feres opinion has repeatedly been characterized as unfair.  Justice 
Scalia condemned ―our clearly wrong decision in Feres and . . . the 
unfairness and irrationality that decision has bred.‖589  It is said that ―[t]he 
injustice of the doctrine is patently obvious and very well known,‖590 and 
that ―[f]ailure to repeal the Feres Doctrine has allowed service members 
unfairly to be treated differently from other persons, and denied 
compensation for injuries suffered.‖591  
The perception of unfairness seems to have two sources.  The first is 
public perception itself.  The ―judicially created‖ shibboleth is not much 
questioned because it is so often repeated.592  The same may be true for the 
―unfairness‖ label.593  The second source begins from the premise that 
service members should be able to sue the government in the same way that 
others can, and concludes it is unfair that  
                                                      
 587. See Jefferson, 74 F. Supp. 209, 216 (D. Md. 1947). 
 588. See Jefferson, 77 F. Supp. 706, 713 (D. Md. 1948), aff’d, 178 F.2d 518 (4th Cir. 
1949), aff’d sub nom. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).   
 589. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 703 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 590. Barry, supra note 8, at 121; accord Johnson, 481 U.S. at 701 n.* (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (listing cases and law review articles critical of Feres); see also Dana Michael 
Hollywood, Creating a True Army of One:  Four Proposals to Combat Sexual Harassment 
in Today’s Army, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 192 (2007) (describing the argument that 
Feres has engendered ―unfairness and irrationality‖ as ―most compelling‖); Miller, supra 
note 572, at 336 (explaining the unfairness imposed by a service member‘s inability to 
choose a place of residence working in tandem with the Feres doctrine to prevent the choice 
of state tort law). 
 591. A.B.A. & B. ASS‘N OF D.C., supra note 7, at 19.   
 592. See supra Part IV.B.3.a. 
 593. See, e.g., Barry, supra note 8, at 121 (stating, without citation, that ―[t]he injustice 
of the doctrine is patently obvious and very well known‖). 
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they cannot.594  That premise ignores the distinctive relationship  
service members have with the government.595  It also glosses over  
the workers‘ compensation-like trade of accepting assured, administrative, 
no-fault compensation in exchange for forgoing the opportunity to bring 
suit in tort and recover more damages.596  The real consequence of Feres is 
that, for purposes of suing their employer in tort, the government‘s military 
employees are treated in roughly the same fashion as employees of other 
employers.597  This is hardly unfair.598 
CONCLUSION 
To discuss the consequences of the Feres decision it may be helpful to 
return to first principles.  A sovereign state can be sued only to the extent 
that it has consented to be sued and only its legislative branch can give 
such consent.599  Absent an applicable waiver of sovereign immunity, the 
United States cannot be sued for damages.600  Any such waiver ―must be 
unequivocally expressed in statutory text . . . and will not be implied.‖601  
Congress created such a waiver when it passed the Federal Tort Claims 
Act.   
The issue in Feres was direct and specific:  ―[W]hether the Tort Claims 
Act extends its remedy to one sustaining ‗incident to the service‘ what 
under other circumstances would be an actionable wrong.‖602  This is an all 
or nothing proposition—either Congress provided the necessary waiver for 
incident-to-service suits or it did not.  The Court held that Congress had not 
                                                      
 594. See, e.g., supra notes 590–91. 
 595. See supra Part IV.B.1.b. 
 596. See Michael L. Richmond, Protecting the Power Brokers:  Of Feres, Immunity, and 
Privilege, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 623, 644–47 (1988) (exploring the notion that the 
compensation rationale of Feres is analogous to a workers‘ compensation scheme in 
justifying the disallowance of FTCA claims).    
 597. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 35, § 5A.05; supra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 598. See JAYSON & LONGSTRETH, supra note 37, § 5A.05 (―[T]here appears to be little 
validity to the view that it is a harsh and inequitable doctrine that Congress simply could not 
have intended to impose on servicemen.‖); Joan M. Bernott, Fairness and Feres:  A Critique 
of the Presumption of Injustice, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 51, 69–70 (1987) (―Servicemen 
already enjoy greater access to federal relief for most injury than do all other federal 
employees; equity does not compel exacerbating this disparity by revoking or limiting 
Feres.‖); supra Part IV.B.1.c. 
 599. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990) (observing that the 
power to consent to suits and waive sovereign immunity is ―reserved to Congress‖); United 
States v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940) (explaining that without the 
consent of the sovereign, the ―attempted exercise of judicial power is void‖). 
 600. See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting United States 
v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)). 
 601. Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing United States v. Nordic Vill., Inc., 
503 U.S. 30, 33–34, 37 (1992); Irwin v. Dep‘t of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990)). 
 602. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138 (1950). 
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intended the FTCA to encompass claims arising out of activity incident to 
military service.603  Accordingly, because the FTCA does not provide an 
applicable waiver, incident-to-service claims are barred by sovereign 
immunity.604  
Three consequences logically follow from Feres‘ holding that 
Congressional enactment of the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity 
for incident-to-service claims.  First, the decision is directly applicable only 
to the FTCA.  Feres is only persuasive authority for other statutes and areas 
of law.  In explaining its holding, the Feres Court discussed a number of 
rationales or factors that supported its conclusion that Congress had not 
included incident-to-service claims in the FTCA.  These rationales include 
the absence of any comparable private person liability,605 the distinctively 
federal relationship between service members and the United States,606 the 
inappropriateness of using varying state laws to govern that relationship,607 
and finally, the compensation system Congress established for military 
personnel and the absence of any direction from Congress as to how 
moneys from the two remedies would be adjusted.608  Because they proved 
useful, these rationales were adopted as reasons counseling hesitation in 
recognizing constitutional tort remedies for injuries that arise out of or in 
the course of activity incident to military service.609  They were also found 
useful in determining whether the Suits in Admiralty Act, the Death on the 
High Seas Act, or the Public Vessels Act waive sovereign immunity for 
incident-to-service injuries.610  With regard to the Privacy Act, they 
correctly were not.611   
The second consequence is that the rationales supporting the Court‘s 
analysis in Feres are not elements of a defense.612  They are, taken together, 
                                                      
 603. See id. at 146. 
 604. See id.; supra notes 599–603. 
 605. See Feres, 340 U.S. at 141–42. 
 606. See id. at 143–44. 
 607. See id. at 142–43 (noting that soldiers serve in a ―number of places in quick 
succession,‖ making the use of geography to determine the selection of law for their tort 
claims an imprudent choice). 
 608. See id. at 144. 
 609. See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 683–84 (1987) (quoting Chappell v. 
Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983)).  
 610. Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30301-30308 (2006); The Suits in 
Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 30901-30918 (2006); Public Vessels Act, 46 U.S.C.  
§§ 31101-31113 (2006); Blakey v. U.S.S. Iowa, 991 F.2d 148, 150–52 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(adopting the Feres analysis for these statutes); see also Miller v. United States, 42 F.3d 
297, 300 (5th Cir. 1995); Charland v. United States, 615 F.2d 508, 509 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Beaucoudray v. United States, 490 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 
 611. See Cummings v. Dep‘t of the Navy, 279 F.3d 1051, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(rejecting a Feres-based argument in a Privacy Act case). 
 612. See generally Maas v. United States, 94 F.3d 291, 295 (7th Cir. 1996) (explaining 
that the extent to which the Feres rationales are present in a case does not impact the 
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an explanation for the Feres conclusion that Congress did not contemplate 
that the FTCA would provide a tort remedy for incident-to-service claims.  
But debating whether a particular inquiry will disrupt military discipline or 
whether a government contractor is entitled to compensation does not 
change the core holding—Congress did not waive sovereign immunity for 
tort suits by service members related to military service.613 
The third consequence of Feres‘ holding is simple.  Because the Court 
held that the FTCA is not a waiver of sovereign immunity for incident-to-
service claims, federal courts, including the Supreme Court, lack the 
authority to modify Feres because they do not have the authority to waive 
sovereign immunity.614  The Court does have authority to decide that it had 
been mistaken in Feres about what Congress intended and to overturn the 
entire doctrine, but successfully and credibly revisiting and reversing such 
a legislative interpretation sixty years after the fact would be extremely 
difficult.  
Certainly Congress can undo Feres, as the Court has repeatedly 
recognized.615  Whether it should do so is a matter that might be debated.  
While that argument is beyond the scope of this article, a thorough 
understanding of the historical and legal backdrop to the FTCA and the 
Feres decision would elevate such a debate above the generalities and blind 
assumptions that have too frequently been lodged against Feres in the past. 
 
                                                      
doctrine‘s application); Verma v. United States, 19 F.3d 646, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per 
curiam) (―[W]hether or not the circumstances of a case implicate the rationales for the Feres 
doctrine, the doctrine bars any damage suit against the United States for injuries incurred 
incident to military service.‖). 
 613. See United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 690–92 (1987) (rejecting a test for 
liability that would require analyzing Feres rationales); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 
52, 58–59 (1985); Stencel Aero Eng‘g Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666,  
672–73 (1977). 
 614. See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 610 (1990); United States v. U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506, 514 (1940). 
 615. See, e.g., Johnson, 481 U.S. at 686; Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 138, 146 
(1950). 
